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RURAL LANDS AND EVOLVING TENURE 
ARRANGEMENTS IN ETHIOPIA: 
Issues, Evidence and Policies 
Tesfaye Teklu 
Abstract 
There are important changes in tenure arrangements and 
practices since 1975 but with mixed performance. Among the positive 
attributes of these changes is the simplification of the complex tenure 
systems as compared to the pre-1975 period albeit questionable if 
such level of homogeneity has a desirable mix of tenure arrangements. 
A large segment of the farm population is able to access and operate 
land. There is a broadening of the land distribution of the country by 
shifting the concentration of landholdings towards the middle and 
lower-sized farm categories. There are incremental policy changes 
that include transfer land to heirs, titling of use rights, and relaxing 
restriction on rental markets in some regions. The constitutionality of 
some of these changes is, however, questionable since the 1995 
constitution still prohibits any transfer of land other than through 
state mandated institutions. 
On the other hand, there are increasing numbers of small-sized 
farms. Some of these are uneconomic in size. There are growing 
numbers of rural households with no access to government allocated 
land ("landless"). Insecurity of land and tree tenure effectively 
reduces rights in land, reduces incentive to invest in land and grow 
perennial crops, and limits growth in rental markets. There is also 
evidence of a widespread breakdown in common property tenure 
arrangements such as common grazing and forestlands for lack of 
effective institution to economize on and efficiently use these 
resources. The residence requirement for having and maintaining 
access to government allocated land fragments land markets and 
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restricts migration as a strategy for diversifying income and pooling 
risks, and easing pressure on land. 
The history of land policy sequencing since 1975 has been 
guided by an unbalanced policy framework with heavy emphasis on 
equity through administrative-based land allocation. A preferred path 
of policy development would have been to allow multiple channels of 
acquiring land, strengthen security of tenure and rights in land, 
promote rental markets as a main market-based mechanism, foster 
effectiveness of indigenous institutions to economize on scarce land 
resources in the commons, set norms and regulations for protecting 
fragile ecosystems, encourage labor mobility, and enhance 
development of factor markets in a context of broad-based 
agricultural and rural development. Public policy has an important 
role in the future, but it needs an informed and balanced view that 
emphasizes on searching for equitable but efficient and sustainable 
tenure arrangements that are mediated through the market place. 
i i i 
I Introduction 
Since the 1975 proclamation of the public ownership of rural land 
(No. 31/1975), the country has effectively abandoned its various 
indigenous tenure arrangements and organized under a generalized 
uniform state-managed tenure system. Ownership of land was vested 
in the state abrogating the 1955 constitution that recognized private 
ownership of property. The change to state ownership was enshrined 
in the 1987 (No 1/1987) as well as the 1995 (No. 1/95) constitutions. 
The federal government issued the rural land administration 
proclamation (No. 89/1997) that vested power in regional states to 
enact regional laws for administration of rural land consistent with the 
principles and laws of the federal constitution. 
Farmers have open-ended usufruct rights to land in peasant 
association (PA) or Kebele administration (KA) where they reside, but 
subject to a proof of permanent physical residence, and ability to farm 
continuously and meet administrative dues and obligations. Today the 
majority of the farm households have access to land through State-
mandated peasant associations. However, the importance of these 
associations as a vehicle of access to land is on decline since their 
ability to meet the growing demand for land, especially their capacity 
to balance factor proportions at farm level, is limited. 
Parallel to this system of PA-based land allocation, there are 
emerging rental land markets and non-market mediated means of land 
acquisition such as gifts and inheritance. But transacting in rental 
markets is gaining importance in different parts of the country, as 
evident from the numbers of transacting farmers. Farmers choose 
these markets as ways to pool resources to balance factors of 
production at farm level (for example, land to labor or land to oxen) 
and risks. Because non-land factor markets are missing or incomplete, 
farmers use these land markets as a substitute for missing or 
incomplete factor markets, such as credit, oxen and labor markets. By 
tying together these transactions commonly in share tenancy, these 
informal land markets provide a vehicle to overcome imbalances in 
factor proportions at farm level, access to non-land factors such as 
labor, oxen and credit, and potentially improve production efficiency. 
This review paper focuses mainly on the state-managed tenure 
system (PA-land or KA-land) and the emerging rental land markets. 
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Whilst most African farmers hold land under indigenous communal 
tenure arrangements and evolve towards individualized rights in 
response to increasing scarcity value of land and competition, the 
process has been discontinued in the Ethiopian context. The debate on 
land issues in Ethiopia center on efficacy and efficiency of a state-
controlled tenure system and its flexibility in evolving towards 
individualized tenure arrangements including graduating to a freehold 
system that is consistent with the overarching goal of equity, 
efficiency and sustainability of land resources. 
The inclusion of the rental markets in this review is deliberate in 
recognition that they represent the seed of the future market-based 
tenure system in the country. These emerging markets provide a 
unique opportunity to learn and draw lessons from since the emphasis 
in future is more likely to be searching for equitable but efficient 
tenure arrangements that are mediated through the market place. 
Mature and competitive land markets provide an effective mechanism 
to signal scarcity value of land, mediate land transfers to efficient 
farmers, and equalize factor proportions. Public policy needs to 
recognize these chief functions of land markets and create the right 
environment and guide the process of market development. 
There are fourteen thematic areas covered in this review. This 
introductory part states the purpose of the review and lays out its 
organization. Part two identifies the different modes of access to land 
including rental markets. Part three and four cover evidence 
respectively on determinants of size and inequality of land area 
operated. Part five presents different measures and determinants of 
land insecurity and its effect on command over land rights. Part six 
traces the trends in land degradation, perceptions and responses, and 
role of tenure insecurity in influencing investment decisions. Part 
seven and eight relate mainly to tenure effects on factor intensity, 
production efficiency and technological change, and consequently on 
agricultural productivity. Part nine focuses on these links, and also 
points the sufficiency of land as a consistent poverty indicator. Part 
ten reiterates the role of labor mobility as a way to ease land pressure, 
diversify income, and pool risks across geographical space. Part 
eleven highlights the decline in common property land resources, 
underlying causes and changing tenure arrangements. Part twelve 
links gender to land access and control, security of tenure, agricultural 
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productivity and poverty. Part thirteen highlights the existing land 
debate and policy response. The paper ends with highlights of the 
major findings and concluding remarks in part fourteen. 
The issues covered in the review are common knowledge to 
students of Ethiopian land issues and this is a first attempt to present a 
comprehensive synthesis of existing empirical evidence, identification 
of knowledge gaps, and map key issues to policy responses. Since 
what is greatly sought among researchers is to add value to 
knowledge, this review takes an inventory of what knowledge exists. 
In addition, the review points to where analytical empirical policy 
research is necessary to deepen the theoretical underpinning and 
debate on land policy in Ethiopia. Such an effort is particularly critical 
at this juncture as the tenure systems that are dominated by ideology 
of state-control, entitlement and administrative-based allocation are 
evolving towards efficiency biased market-based systems. 
II Access (Venue) To Land 
The 1995 constitution guarantees free access of land to rural 
households who seek and are able to cultivate in their place of 
residence. Such access through the official channel is conditional on 
proof of permanent physical residence, ability to farm continuously, 
and meet administrative dues and obligations. Qualified farmers have 
open-ended usufruct rights to land. These use rights are inheritable 
.but the constitution bars any other forms of land transfer including 
land rental. There are, however, multiple channels of acquiring 
agricultural land that operate in de factor and some are gaining legal 
recognition in some region-states albeit questions on their 
constitutionality (Kifle, 1999). 
The majority of farm households have land obtained through 
peasant associations (hereafter, PA-land or Kebele land 
interchangeably) 
Farmers are organized in peasant associations within an officially 
demarcated physical area that does not exceed 800-hectare'. Within 
' The boundaries in most cases were demarcated following topographic contour lines, 
such as rivers, valleys and mountains, and clan groupings and alignments (Alula and 
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these associations, every eligible farm household is entitled to a 
minimum plot of land regardless of ability to farm. The primary 
mandate of the peasant associations (PAs) is to ensure this safety net 
entitlement is realized through distribution of land 'equally' among 
qualified resident members within the official ceiling of 10-hectares 
per household. Additional factors such as gender, size of working 
members in a household, and ownership of assets such as traction 
power are considered, but are not fully factored in the determination 
of land allocation. 
The peasant associations had carried out major land 
redistributions involving large number of holdings and area of PA-
land in early years of the land reform that spanned over the period 
between 1976 and 1978 (see, for example, Alula and Tesfaye, 1980 
and Dessalegn, 1984). The frequency of major land redistributions has 
decreased, especially since the early 1990s to reduce uncertainty in 
land tenure and transaction costs associated with frequent 
redistributions. Instead most of the PAs reallocate land and adjust plot 
size to accommodate new claimants. Commonly, PAs reallocate land 
obtained from farm households who have abandoned farming for 
various reasons (for example, death, permanent migration, tax default, 
and failure to comply with PA imposed obligatory services) and/or 
convert communal lands to individual holdings (for example, 
community grazing lands). 
Although the PA-land allocation has been the main a venue for 
land acquisition, its importance is on decline. The pool of PA-land is 
fixed and land suitable for cultivation has already been distributed but 
there are continuous demands for land because of the natural growth 
in population. The demographic momentum is strong since there is 
large pool of people coming of age for farming. Since the physical 
supply of PA land is fixed, the same land has to be sub-divided among 
Tesfaye, 1980). Since the boundaries were not drawn uniformly by taking into 
account population size and productive capacity of land, there is a wide diversity in 
quality-adjusted area of land relative to population among peasant associations. In 
areas where population density is high and land is scarce, peasant associations tend to 
have a large population on a small area of land. And, because of low spatial mobility 
of labor, these associations face a severe land constraint as the number of new 
claimants for land grows within their fixed physical boundaries. 
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eligible farmers as the size of membership in a peasant association 
grows. Prohibition to possess land outside residential area accentuates 
the competition for declining available land per capita. There is now a 
limit as to how much fixed supply of PA-land can thus be subdivided 
without reducing them to an uneconomical size. On the one hand, PA 
attempts to provide every one with a means of livelihood, on the other 
they are saddled with a fixed and unchanging land fund and a growing 
population (Dessalegn, 1984). 
The ideal of allocating land proportional to household size has 
become less and less attainable. The more recent claimants of land, 
who were largely newly formed households, were more likely to 
receive smaller and less productive plots, and lack grazing land 
(Amare, 1998; Yared, 1995). Because of the diminishing capacity of 
PAs to meet the demands for land, there are a sizable number of 
farmers who seek but are unable to get PA-land. The modal estimate 
is in the 30 to 40 percent range in any peasant association, particularly 
in densely populated areas (see, for example, the case studies in 
Dessalegn 1994; Gavian and Amare, 1996; Abebe, 2000). These 
estimates are likely to be biased downward since new claimants to 
land are at times excluded from membership in peasant associations to 
circumvent the constitutional guaranteed right to land for registered 
members (Gavian and Amare, 1996). 
There are increasing numbers of farmers transacting in rental land 
markets. 
While PA-based land allocation has been the principal means for land 
acquisition, access to land through informal rental land markets (crop-
sharing and cash rental) is gaining importance2. There are four factors 
contributing to these increasing trends. Firstly, the ability of the 
peasant associations to accommodate a continuous demand for land is 
diminishing, as it is evident from the growing numbers of farmers 
with no PA-lands, especially among the newly formed young farm 
2 Informal land transactions cover market-mediated (rental contracts such as crop-
sharing and cash rental) and non-market mediated transfers (for example, borrowing, 
gift). The focus of this paper is on informal rental land transactions. The terms share 
cropping, crop sharing and share rental are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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households. Secondly, matching land to largely non-traded factors 
such as labor and oxen and continuously correcting changes in factor 
proportions at farm level is beyond the capacity of administrative-
based allocation. Thirdly, the policy changes that have been instituted 
since 1989, which include the rights to use hired labor, bequeath use 
rights to land and rent land, have created an enabling environment and 
incentive for the growth of non-PA based channels for land 
acquisition. Fourthly, farmers who participate in rental land markets 
are able to combine rental land contracts with other factor markets 
(e.g., labor, oxen, credit) and overcome problems associated with 
missing or incomplete factor markets (a second-best solution). 
Within peasant associations, there are three major categories of 
farm households that coexist (see Tesfaye et al, 2000 for a description 
of these categories). The first category is the 'autarky' farm 
households who are fully self-provisioning in essential factor inputs. 
The second group is land-constrained farm households with PA-land 
that is insufficient to fully utilize their labor and traction power3. The 
third category is land abundant farm households with PA-lands that 
are in excess of the size they can utilize with their own labor and 
traction power. Transactions in rental land markets often occur 
between the latter two categories of farm households. The current 
evidence indicates that as many as 15-30 percent of farm households 
in different parts of the country (for example, see the studies in 
Dessalegn, 1994; Abebe, 2000; Gavian and Amare 1996; Bereket and 
Croppenstedt, 1995, EEA/EEPRI, 2002). 
The demand for land comes largely from land - constrained 
farmers whose main objective is to increase an area of operated land. 
The better off farmers, who have labor, oxen, seed and cash, are more 
into renting land since they rarely hire out their labor. But those who 
are short in land, oxen and cash, especially the young and newly 
3 A farm household is defined as land-constrained if officially given PA-land is 
insufficient to utilize its largely non-tradable factor inputs, particularly family labor 
and oxen. On the other hand, a land-abundant household has a given PA-land that 
cannot be fully utilized because of shortage of labor or oxen or finance. Such 
definition does not suggest that land-constrained (land-abundant) household is 
necessarily poor (or, better-off) since PA-land holding is not related to possession of 
non-farm assets. Determination of PA-land is mainly driven by consumption or safety 
net consideration rather than ability to produce and generate income. 
6 
formed households, either exchange their labor for land or hire out 
their labor. If the lessee has a reputation for trustworthiness and 
industriousness, he may acquire land from non-parental sources in the 
form of rent (Yared, 1995). 
The regression estimates in Gebeyehu (1992) show that the 
decision on whether to rent-in land or not (i.e. the decision to assume 
partial or full tenancy) is related positively with the size of draft 
animals, the presence of working male adults, and household wealth. 
It is negatively related to the size of PA-land and the better quality of 
land. These coefficients confirm that land-constrained with working 
labor and non-land assets such as traction animals are more likely to 
rent in land. The odd of participation is also positive for landless 
households but may not be as strong since some of the positively 
contributing factors such as size of draft animals are missing or is 
weak. 
On the supply side, there are land abundant farm households. But 
all land abundant farmers are not engaged in leasing out land. The 
better off farmers who have sufficient oxen and working capital rarely 
lease out their land to get labor. Instead they use their own oxen and 
cash to get labor to work on their farms or team up and pool resources. 
In some case, they lease in land to get more access and control fertile 
land through tying land from abundant poor households. 
It is mainly the land abundant but poor households who often 
lease out land. These poor households are the most resource 
constrained among the relatively land abundant farmers. They cannot 
afford to hire in labor and/or oxen. Instead they share out their land in 
exchange for labor and/or oxen. They are also financially constrained 
and often seek credit to meet their obligations including food 
consumption. They either rent-out land for cash or mortgage land for 
credit or include a cash deposit as a requirement for tenants to access 
land. These farmers are not the commonly understood "landlords" 
who hold economic and social power. These include the poor, female-
and elderly-headed households who rent out land due to necessity 
(Yared, 1995, Abebe, 2000). 
The econometric evidence in Tesfaye and Adugna (forthcoming) 
shows that the decision to lease out land is positively correlated with 
the size of PA-land relative to other complementary inputs such as 
labor and oxen, poor quality of land, female-headship, number of 
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dependents in a household, poor adult nutritional status, and distance 
from better infrastructure and market access. Consistent with the 
hypothesis of subsistence pressure, as the number of dependents in a 
family increases, farmers lease out land in exchange for access to 
credit for meeting consumption needs. Families with malnourished 
adults are also physically constrained and hence tend to lease out more 
land. These transactions are more prevalent among poor female-
headed households who lack resources and managerial ability to work 
on their farms. 
But the rental land markets favor farmers with cash, farm skills and 
experience. 
As arable land becomes scarce, conditions are getting tight in regards 
to rental land; the lesser demands increased output share including by-
products, contribution of variable inputs, up front fee to buy the right 
to rent (akin to buying option in equity market), and proof of farming 
skills and experience. These requirements work against the poor, 
young and inexperienced "landless" farmers. Some are rationed or 
priced out because of the increasing rental rate and tightening 
selection criteria. 
T h e s e disadvantaged farmers depend heavily on other means of 
getting land. As many as 77 % of the farmers with no PA-land in 
Debre Libanos had to obtain land through their parents and cultivate 
on a share basis (Yohannes, 1994). Among the farmers with no PA-
land in the vicinity of Assela in Arsi region, 50 percent of the 
contracted fields were obtained though gifts and borrowing (Gavian 
and Amare, 1996). This is in contrast with landed households whose 
share of contracted fields through borrowing and sharing was only 14 
percent. Among the young male households who have established 
their households after the 1975 land reform in west Gojjam, 79% 
worked on their parent's plot (Yigremew, 1997). As compared to the 
land they obtained through peasant associations, the land through their 
parents was 1.3 times greater. They worked on their parent's plot and 
shared the output. 
Although these are married and heads of their own households, 
they are not socially considered as adults and not recognized as 
'equals' since they still depend on their parents for their livelihood 
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(Teferi, 1994). Instead of working on their parent's land, the children 
may claim land as they reach eighteen, the legal age for claiming land. 
There are moral and technical grounds for children to claim land of 
their parents. First, it is customary in the kinship/rist tenure areas for 
children to claim land through decent ("Gulma"). It is also a moral 
obligation for parents to look after their children until they are 
established. Second, land through PAs is based on the consideration of 
the number of family members. Thus, the share of land of the children 
is already included in their parents' land holdings at the time of the 
PA land allocation. So these children have a legitimate right to claim 
their share of land when they form their homestead. 
However, such an inter-generational transfer of land through 
hereditary is not as widely practiced as it is in the rest of Africa. First, 
the legal interpretation of claim over parental land is not always 
without conflict. The process of land transfer between parents and 
children has caused social friction in areas where PA-land is scarce 
and/or PA-land allocation was halted (Teferi, 1994). Secondly, there is 
a recognition that land obtained through hereditary is small and it is 
not worth the damage that is caused by intra-family conflict. Hence, 
farmers consider land through hereditary as an unsustainable mode of 
land acquisition. 
The institution of marriage acts occasionally as a non-market 
device for getting access to land and pool labor, especially between 
landed female-heads and landless male labor (Yared, 1995; Teferi, 
1994). Where marriage enables married couples to get access to land 
from both parents, there is an increased localization of marriage 
(Yared, 1995). 
To sum up, there are notable variations in the extent and trend of 
modes of access land in rural areas. Farmers obtain land mainly 
though area-based peasant associations. While this has been the main 
venue to access land, its importance is on decline because of the 
physical limit imposed by the fixed area of land and inefficiency 
inherent in administrative based land allocation. Instead, the venue of 
land access through rental land markets is gaining importance. 
Farmers who participate in rental land markets are able to combine 
rental land contracts with other factor markets (e.g. labor, oxen, credit) 
and overcome problems associated with missing or incomplete factor 
markets. But access to rental land is becoming difficult for farmers 
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with little farming experience and skills, and cash. These farmers 
either work on their parental land and/or as casual labor and/or engage 
in a non-farming activity. 
Ill Area of Land Operated 
According to the national survey of private peasant landholdings 
conducted in 1997/98 (CSA 1998), nearly 80 percent of the holdings 
were below 2 hectares. A quarter of the holdings were below a one-
half hectare. The average land holding per holder was nearly one 
hectare, which constitutes areas for temporary crops (77.4%), 
permanent crops (6.2%), grazing (6.6%), fallow (5.6%), and other 
land uses (7.2%). 
While farm size is small in general, there are still significant 
differences in distribution of holdings. This is first linked to 
differences in the spatial distribution of population and arable land in 
the country's major agroecological zones size of arable land holding 
(quality adjusted) tends to be small in the moisture-stressed drylands 
(arid and semi-arid zones) where inherent soil fertility is poor. 
Population density is sparse in the lowlands but available arable land 
is low (for example, size of land per arable holding averages 0.21 ha 
in Shinile, 0.64 ha in Borena and 0.58 ha in Moyale). The size of land 
holding is also low in highlands where land degradation is moderate to 
severe (for example, 0.67 ha in North Wollo). 
Farm size is also small in perennial crop growing humid highland 
areas where land is better endowed for crop cultivation but population 
density is high (for example, the size of land holding averages 0.66 ha 
in Gurage, 0.34 in Sidama, 0.36 in Gedeo, 0.48 in North Omo, and 
0.48 in South Omo). Previous studies also confirm the severity of land 
scarcity in these areas. Half of the households in the high population 
density areas of southern Ethiopia (Bolosso and Wollaita) possess half 
a hectare or less (Dessalegn, 1984). A peasant who works 1 to 1.5 
hectare is considered as a large owner. In the 'enset' growing high 
population density areas of southern Ethiopia, many farmers own as 
little as 0.25 hectare (Sandford and Sandford, 1994). 
The size of land holding is relatively larger in moderately 
populated cereal producing moist zones (for example, 1.54 ha in East 
Welega, 1.24 ha in West Gojjam, 1.5 ha in East Shewa, 1.87 ha in 
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Arsi, and 1.68 ha in Bale) and perennial crop growing humid highland 
areas such as Jimma (0.90 ha) and Illubabor (0.82 ha), particularly 
where population density is moderate, arable land is relatively 
abundant, and land degradation is not severe. 
In general, land tends to be small in ecological zones where there 
is arable land suitable for crop cultivation but population density is 
high. Or, where population density is low available land is not suitable 
for cultivation because of inherent deficiency in the soil fertility or 
severe land degradation. Land size tends to be greater in ecological 
zones where population density is moderate, arable land is relatively 
suitable and land degradation is not severe. 
Even within the same ecological zones, there are significant 
differences in land holdings at peasant association level. Part of these 
differences could be due to an asymmetry in the initial allocation of 
land at peasant association level. The boundaries of these peasant 
associations were not demarcated uniformly in terms of population 
size. Peasant associations with the same area of quality-adjusted land 
may have a different size of population. For example, the average area 
of land per member varied from a low 2.5 hectares to a high of 4.1 
hectares in the ninety-seven peasant associations in the administrative 
area of southern Ethiopia (Alula and Tesfaye, 1980). Peasant 
associations with a better quality of land in general have low land per 
member because of the over population on a relatively small area of 
land. Since farmers can only claim land in peasant associations where 
they permanently reside, these differences in initial endowments of 
fixed PA land influences the area of the land they hold. 
There are also variations in landholdings within peasant 
associations, mainly due to differences in rules of land allocation and 
their applications. Commonly, land is distributed in accordance to 
household size within peasant associations. These associations set a 
minimum size of land that every household is entitled.to. They also set 
a maximum size of holding. Then they allocate land in relation to 
family size within the lower and upper bounds. Generally, the relation 
between land size and family size is positive. But it is not linear since 
the increment in land is often less than the increment in number of 
family members. The increment even approaches zero for large 
families (Dessalegn, 1984). There are differences between peasant 
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associations in the minimum and maximum size, and the unit of land 
that is added for each household member. 
In some areas, the rules of PA-land allocation explicitly accounts 
for differences in the age-composition of farm households as shown in 
recent evidence from Tigray region (Berhanu, 1998; Bruce, Hoben 
and Dessalegn, 1994) and the Amhara region (Yigremew, 1997; 
Yeraswork 2000). For example, in Tigray region, a 'share', the 
amount of land that each adult should receive in a particular 
community, is first determined. Each adult, regardless of gender, 
receives one share. Children, up to a pre-set number per household, 
are given fractional shares (Bruce, Hoben and Dessalegn, 1994). 
Land allocation tends to favor older than younger household 
heads, especially where land is scarce. The allocation tends to be 
biased towards the more experienced farmers in the 25 to 59 year age 
category. Because of their proven management skills, which have a 
high premium in an environment of land scarcity, they tend to have 
more access to land. The young households, because of their youth 
and limited farm experience, obtain less land then farmers with 
established farming experience. But such age-differentiation is not as 
strong where availability of land is not tight. 
Factors other than household size and composition are 
occasionally considered in the allocation of PA- land. Where 
availability of land is not tight, upward adjustment in land is made to 
account for the size of livestock owned. Distance to residence is 
considered in some areas in dividing PA-land. Farmers in Wogda 
locality, northern Shewa received at least one plot of land close to the 
homestead -"dej meret" (Yared, 1995). Building one's house near a 
piece of desirable land was often a tactic successfully used to lay 
claim to such land (Yared, 1995). Consideration of past political and 
administrative status also plays a role in determining allocation of 
land, as evidenced from the 1996/97 allocation of land in the Amhara 
region. Bruce, Hobben and Dessalegn (1994) also cite spot cases of 
discriminatory land allocation based on ethnic and religious 
differences. 
All PA-lands are not fully operated. Nor are all land operated is 
PA-land where there are active land transactions through transfers 
such as land rental. For those transacting in rental land markets, 
especially those who lease in land ("import"), size of land operated 
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may exceed land obtained through peasant associations. Even those 
who share out land but farm jointly benefit from such transactions 
since they are able to operate large area of land using tenant's labor. In 
the villages of southern Ethiopia, for example, those who shared out 
land and farmed jointly were able to increase the area operated from 
0.16 hectare to 0.30 hectare. Those who shared in land and farmed 
jointly increased their area operated from 0.29 ha to 0.40 ha. 
Which of these factors then have a statistically significant 
influence on the area of land operated at the farm level? The 
coefficients from a two-stage estimation of ordinary least squares 
regression model are presented in Table 4.1. The study draws on 
survey data collected in three districts of Southern Ethiopia. The 
dependent variable is the area of land operated at farm level, which 
includes land from peasant associations and net addition from 
transactions in rental markets The area of land operated is specified as 
the function of: (1) household demographic variables (household size 
and composition, and gender and age of household); (2) level of 
education of household head; (3) level of asset ownership (livestock); 
(4) transaction status in land rental markets; (5) access to roads and 
markets; and (6) village dummy variables. The village dummy 
variables are included to capture variation in population density, and 
land quality attributes (i.e., agro-climate, soil fertility and moisture). 
The physical infrastructure variable represents a proxy for availability 
of off-farm employment opportunity outside the survey villages. Since 
the inclusion of a variable representing transaction status in land rental 
markets potentially causes a simultaneity problem, the instrumental 
variable method is used below in a two-stage estimation framework4. 
The results establish four key factors in explaining the variation 
in the area of land operated - at least in the context of the areas where 
the survey villages are represented. Firstly, the village characteristics 
within which farmers reside, such as ecological and soil conditions, 
4 The first stage is the estimation of a binary probit equation where the dependent 
variable is a decision dummy variable (1 if the households transact in rental land 
market and 0 otherwise). The values of the probability of transacting in land market 
were predicted from the probit equation and then entered in the main equation at the 
second stage of estimation. Three factors in particular stand out as determinants of the 
decision whether to transact in land market or not --ecological factors, physical access 
to major market place, and size of land obtained from peasant associations (PA-land). 
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and population density, have a significant influence on the area of land 
operated. Consistent with the neo-Malthusian hypothesis that rural 
population tends to be concentrated in areas where there is land 
suitable for cultivation to meet subsistence needs, and good climate 
and soil have a small area of land operated per capita.. 
Secondly, the demographic characteristics of farm households, 
especially family size, have a significant influence on land allocation. 
Size of households have a significant positive (HHSIZE) but 
diminishing (HHSSQ) influence on the area of land operated. This is 
consistent with PA-based land allocation practices. That is, as the size 
of a household increases, the size of land increases but the incremental 
land for every additional household member decreases. As detailed in 
Dessalegn (1984), increase in household size beyond mutually agreed 
land ceiling has even zero incremental effect in some peasant 
associations. That is, the additional number of household has a zero 
effect on land size. The effect of other demographic variables - age 
and gender - is not as strong as the simple count of household 
members. 
Thirdly, transacting in informal rental markets adds to the area of 
land operated particularly for those who lease in land and operate. 
These transactions are more concentrated in areas where arable land is 
scarce and its distribution is more unequal, and access to alternative 
non-farm employment exists. 
Finally, the presence of a physical infrastructure has a significant 
influence directly on the area of land operated and indirectly through 
increased participation in rental land markets. Size of land operated 
tends to be small in areas with better infrastructure, which is often 
associated with more population density and better income 
opportunity. 
To sum up, the farm size is generally small in the Ethiopian 
highlands, and it is declining but its size varies depending on 
agroecological environment and the number of venues through which 
a farmer acquires land. For those who access land through peasant 
associations, farm size is a function of land available at PA-level and 
allocation rules within peasant associations (for example, family size 
and composition, ownership of assets). Those who transact through 
informal rental land markets benefit from the increase in the area of 
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land operated per family labor. The effect of these factors determines 
the area of land operated at farm level. 
Table 4.1: A Two-stage Estimation of Ordinary Least Squares 
Regression Model for Determinants of Area of Land Operated 
Probit OLS-IV 
Variable Variable definition Coefficient Marginal-effect 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) 
Constant Intercept -0.1373 -0.0518 -0.2492 -0.0832 (-0.227) (-0.227) (-0.589) (0.198) 
Dummy for ecological 0.8961 0.3388 -1.2558 -1.2617 
zone: (4.816)" ' (4.818)*" (-4.957)*" (-4.930)*" 
DECOL 1=higher elevation, 0=lower elevation 
(Mean=0.345, 
SE=0.476) 
Dummy for highland 2.1575 0.8156 -2.0915 -2.1581 
village 01: (4.259)*" (4.236)"* (-7.857)*" (-8.060)*" 
DV1 0= lower elevation 
(Mean=0.07, 
SE=0.256) 
Dummy for highland 1.6102 0.6087 -2.0915 -3.7221 
village 11: (7.027)'" (6.999)*" (-7.857)" ' (-10.31)*" 
DV11 0= lower elevation 
(Mean=0.249, 
E=0.433) 
Household sex: -0.2619 -0.0989 0.0648 0.0629 
HHSEX 1=male (Mean=0.893, 
SE=0.309) 
(-1.251) (-1.251) (0.456) (0.438) 
Household head age 0.0252 0.0095 -0.0186 -0.0180 
HHAGE (Mean = 44.324, 
SE=14.383) 
(1.176) (1.176) (-1.263) (-1.210) 
HHAGSQ HHHAGE squared -0.0002 -0.00006 0.0001 0.0001 (-0.711) (-0.711) (0.749) (0.724) 
Dummy for education 0.3449 0.1304 -0.0646 -0.0503 
of household head: (1.956)" (1.957)" (-0.533) (-0.411) 
DEDHH 1 if greater than one year, 0=otherwise 
(Mean=0.213, 
SE=0.410) 
Number of household -0.1123 -0.0424 0.3084 0.1691 
HHSIZE members (-1.659)* (-1.659)* (6.945)*" (12.200)'** (Mean=6.983, 
SE=3.343) 
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Probit OLS-IV 
Variable Variable definition Coefficient Marginal-
effect 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-ratio) (t-ratio) (t-ratio) 
HHSSQ HHSIZE squared 0.0032 0.0012- -0.0075 
Ratio of adults to 
(0.3421) (0.950) (-3.281)*" 
0.3183 
RADULT household size (1.312) (Mean=0.498, 
SE=0.178) 
Land area from 0.1087 0.0411 
PMREA peasant association in (1.6490)* (1.957)** ha (Mean=1.489, 
SE=1.228) 
Water logging index: 0.1875 0.0709 
WATERI 1=none, 0.25 = severe (2.077)" (2.080)'* (Mean=1.448, 
SE=1.32) 
Erosion index: -0.1503 -0.0568 0.0284 0.0337 
EROSNI 1=none, 0.25=severe (-1.535) (-1.535) (0.650) (0.763) (Mean 
=1.370,SE=1.60) 
Value of livestock in -0.00004 -0.000008 0.00005 0.00005 
VLVSTK local currency: (-0.201) (-0.201) (0.788) (0.765) 
(Mean=823, SE=744) 
Distance from road in -0.0874 -0.0331 0.1474 0.1493 
DROAD km (-2.970)"* (-2.959)*** (7.898)"* (7.913)*** (Mean=7.465, 
SE=4.918) 
PTLAND Predicted probability of 1.0475 1.0596 transacting land (4.281)*" (4.291)"* 
N Sample size 498 498 498 
F statistics 25.52*** 24.37"* 
Adjusted R 0.3907 0.3794 
square 
Log likelihood -272.9036 -671.6005 -676.1951 
Chi-square 119.169"* 
***, ** And * denote significance atp<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.10 
respectively. 
SE=Standard deviation 
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IV Inequality in Area Operated 
One of the key elements of the 1975 land reform is the setting of 
a 10-hectare ceiling. This upper limit to farm size has effectively 
truncated the upper end of the distribution of land ownership. The 
overall effect of the PA based land distribution has been to shift the 
concentration of landholdings towards the middle and lower land-size 
categories. Or, as Dessalegn (1984) described it, it is a "leveling 
down". This is illustrated in figure 5.1.1, which uses two national 
surveys and compares the cumulative distribution of land holdings 
before and after the land reform. Firstly, there is a truncation at about 
5 hectares. All the holdings after the reform fall below 5 hectares, as 
compared to about 80 percent of the holdings before the reform. That 
is, 20 percent of the holdings that had more than 5 hectare have shifted 
to less or equal to 5 hectares after the reform. Secondly, the shift of 
the post-reform curves to the left means there are people getting less 
land. Farmers with larger holdings had to give up some of their land 
for distribution to others - t o the new claimants and those with 
insufficient land. 
Data on distribution of farm holdings from four representative 
localities reported in Dessalegn (1984) were used to derive the 
cumulative distribution of holdings. As the figures in 5.1.2- 5.1.5 
show, the size distributions closely follow the national pattern. 
Regardless of differences in ecological zone, land quality, production 
systems and previous tenure arrangements; the curves are truncated at 
the upper end5, which indicates a shift towards the middle and lower 
ends of the distribution. Secondly, the shift towards the left occurs for 
the majority of the farm households. In the cases of Bolloso and 
Manna, however, the curves shifts to the left, but crosses at the lower 
end. That is, at the lower ending of the distribution, there were some 
farmers who got more land after the reform. In these localities, the 
5 Dessalegn (1984) reports an upper truncation point of 1.25 ha in Bolosso in the 
southern region (down from pre-reform maximum of 1.5 ha), 2.5 ha in Manna in the 
southern west region (down from the pre-reform above 6 ha), 5 ha in Adet in the north 
west region (down from above 6 ha) and 3 ha in Sire in the central western region 
(down from pre-reform above 6 ha). 
1 7 
distribution process scaled up land holdings at the bottom and leveled 
down from the top. In all these sampled cases the process has 
contributed towards an equality in the area of operated land. 
The degree of improved land distribution is, however, different 
between administrative zones (Bedassa Tadesse, 1998). For example, 
the estimated Gini coefficient for Ethiopia as a whole was 0.47, but 
there were several zones going above (e.g., South Shewa, West 
Shewa, North Omo) and falling below (e.g., North Gondar, South 
Gondar, West and East Gojjam) the national average. Explanations as 
to why such spatial variability exists are yet to be established. 
Transactions in informal land markets tend to contribute towards 
equality in the size distribution of land areas operated, albeit seasonal 
and short lived. Firstly, farmers who otherwise would not have had 
access to land were able to get access to land and operate. Secondly, 
the process of equalization of land holdings means that farmers with 
large initial landholdings (pre-transaction) transferred land to those 
with lower holdings. For example, in the study of survey villages in 
southern Ethiopia, the share of the area of total cropped land for the 
bottom 30 percent of the households increased from 7 percent to 12.5 
percent. The ratio of the mean operated area of the top 20 percent to 
the lowest 30 percent decreased from a tenfold to six fold. Transacting 
through informal land markets has thus the effect of broadening the 
distribution of land holdings. 
Since the decision to transact in rental land markets is a self-
selection process, comparing these two groups causes selectivity bias. 
Instead, Tesfaye and Bedassa (2001a) used survey data from villages 
in Southern Ethiopia to rank farm holdings per capita for land 
transacting farm households before and after transaction (Table 5.1). It 
is also used to estimate the Lorenz curve parameters and derive Gini 
coefficients. As the evidence below shows, transactions in informal 
land markets not only raise the area of land operated, but also 
contribute towards equality in the size distribution of land area 
operated. 
Such an equalizing effect of rental markets is noted in Deininger 
and Squire (1998). Based on data on distribution of operational 
holdings from 103 countries, the authors find that the share of land 
rental was below 10% of the total in all developing countries, and the 
Gini coefficient for the distribution of operated land was lower than 
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the Gini coefficient for the distribution of owned land. The lower 
inequality in area operated suggests that rental market contributes to 
more equal distribution of land. These results are also in conformity 
with the findings of Andre and Platteau (1998) for Rwanda, similar 
toEthiopia, experience high population density, scarcity of land, low 
level of agricultural technology, and declining land productivity. 
Temporary land transfers such as land rentals and loans contributed to 
a moderate the impact on the inequality in landholdings in Rwanda. 
But the importance of these transactions declines overtime because of 
the disequalizing effect of land sales. 
Table 4.1: Land Holdings, Lorenz Curve Parameters and Gini 
Pre-transaction Post-transaction 
Mean per 
capita area 
operated (ha) 
Percent of 
total area 
operated 
Mean per 
capita area 
Operated 
(ha) 
Percent of 
total area 
operated 
Bottom 10% 0.03 0.97 0.06 2.47 
20% 0.08 2.55 0.09 3.48 
30% 0.11 3.53 0.11 4.46 
40% 0.16 4.97 0.15 5.72 
50% 0.21 6.80 0.18 7.12 
60% 0.27 8.68 0.23 8.94 
70% 0.32 10.06 0.27 10.70 
80% 0.42 13.52 0.34 13.56 
90% 0.63 20.08 0.45 17.93 
100% 1.27 28.84 0.75 25.61 
OLS Estimates of Lorenz Curve Parameters 
a = 0.864(0.008) p = 
0.864(0.008) 
a = 0.9049(0.015) P = 
0.910(0.017) 
Gini Index = 0.4819 Gini Index=0.3991 
Source: Tesfaye and Bedassa (2001a). Figures in parenthesises are standard errors. 
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1.4: Sire (Wolega) 1.5: Adet(Gojam) 
Legend: Post reform; Pre-reform 
Adjusting for land quality: There is an important caveat in these 
results. The size distribution of operated land above does not take into 
account variation in the quality of land. But quality of land enters 
systematically in PA-land allocation. For example, a simple two-way 
correlation between farm size and land degradation indicators (i.e., 
erosion and water logging indexes) based on survey data from 
Southern Ethiopia shows a systematic inverse relationship between 
land size and intensity of land degradation (Table 5.2). A higher index 
in this table means that more area of land is necessary to compensate 
for declining soil and water quality. For example, a one-hectare of 
land free from water logging quantity is equivalent to total land area 
of 1.87 in the 60 to 80lh percentiles and 2.02 in the above 80,h 
percentiles. 
For the bottom 40 percent of land holdings, the indexes average 
1.47 and 1.2 for erosion and water logging, respectively. The erosion 
index increases from 1.75 in third quintile to 2.02 in the top 20 percent 
of the holdings. For the index on water logging, it rises from 1.47 to 
1.85 for the same land size categories, respectively. Increase in land 
size is thus associated with increase in land necessary to compensate 
for deterioration in land quality 
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Table 4.2: Farm size and Land Quality Relationships by Quintiles 
Mean Holding Mean Erosion Mean Water 
v Size Index Logging Index 
0.496(0.141) 1.263(1.206) 1.506(1.419)^ ^ 
2nd 0.891(0.123) 1.189(1.106) 1.402(1.221) 
3rd 1.371(0.135) 1.463(1.485) 1.742(1.977) 
4th 1.883(0.183) 1.726(1.403) 1.870(1.556) 
5lh 3.358(1.617) 1.185(1.608) 2.017(1.514) 
Correlation ofHolding Size with 0.1505** 
0.1246* 
N=423 
* And ** denote significance at p <0.01 and p <0.001, respectively. 
Figures in parenthesizes are standard deviations. 
Such a pattern is also confirmed in the statistically significant 
positive correlation of 0.15 between land and erosion index, and 0.12 
between land and water logging. As farm size decreases, there is an 
apparent upward adjustment in land quality. This is consistent with the 
practice of PA-based allocation of land in some of the survey villages. 
Farmers with a low quality of land are often compensated with a 
larger area of land. Hence, farmers with small farms end up having 
better quality of land as compared with farmers with large farms. 
The relation between land quality and rental land is inconclusive. 
The findings from the survey of villages in Southern Ethiopia show 
that farmers who lease out land tend to share out eroded land. It is 
probable that farmers with a large land area are selective and lease out 
land that is poor in quality. But this is contingent on the motive for 
land transaction and type of contractual agreement (Gavian and 
Amare, 1996). Hence, the effect of land quality can only be 
empirically determined. 
The presence of a systematic variation in land quality attributes 
between PA-allocated land holdings suggests that distribution of land 
holdings is more equal when quality-adjusted land size is compared. 
Ignoring such adjustment tends to bias upward measures of land 
inequality such as the Gini coefficient. And it also implies that 
productivity differences by farm size will be exaggerated if quality 
attributes of land are not controlled. However, it is possible that the 
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neutralizing effect of land quality on inequality is weaker for land 
transacting households. 
While the initial process of PA-land allocation brought about a 
general equitable distribution of holdings, the process was not to 
satisfaction of some farmers who viewed the process as benefiting the 
long established farmers who had economic resources and better 
connections in local communities and political networks (Yared, 
1995). As access to land through peasant associations becomes scarce, 
distribution in land holdings has become more unequal, especially 
between the old established farmers, and newly formed young 
households. This intergenerational gap in land holdings has caused 
social tension in some areas, especially where the process is frozen for 
the young adults to assume greater access to land and social position 
(Teferi, 1994). 
V Security of Tenure and Command Over Land Rights 
The current problem of insecurity of land tenure has its origin in 
the 1975 land reform proclamation and the subsequent legislations. 
These laws provide use of rights with no defined time bound. Since 
land is state owned, it can be reclaimed through declaration of eminent 
domain without prior knowledge and consent of individual 
landholders. Such an open-ended tenure arrangement causes 
uncertainty (or lack of predictability) with respect to length of land 
possession and ability of farmers to capture benefits that accrue from 
long-term investment in land, whether in use or upon transfer. 
The discussion in this section presents measures of levels of 
security of tenure. Since the degree of security varies between 
landholders, reasons for such variation are identified. Security of 
tenure and control over land are related, and detrimental to the extent 
to which rights to land are exercised. 
Farmers' Perception 
Farmers were asked to express their perceptions of tenure 
insecurity in sampled surveys in Tigray (Berhanu, 1998), Wello and 
north Shewa (Yeraswork, 2000), and Southern Ethiopia (Holden and 
Yohannes, 2001). The findings from a survey of farm households in 
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south central Tigray show that farmers feel more insecure about their 
holdings in the long run. Sixty percent of farmers responded that they 
felt certain that they would cultivate their plots five years from 1995 
whilst 41.7 percent felt sure of being able to leave their plots to their 
children (Berhanu, 1998). 
The farmers and community leaders who were surveyed in five 
Awrajas of Wello and north Shewa (Yaju, Ambassel, Dessie-Zuria, 
Manz, and Tagulat) strongly expressed that they had no sense of 
ownership of land (Yeraswork, 2000). They anticipated future 
redistribution of land, and a partial or complete loss of their own plot. 
Farmers could not plant trees, or those who planted trees opted to 
destroy their private trees because of the fear that they would be 
denied the right to dispose of their own trees whey they desired. 
Farmers in some villages also destroyed their soil bunds since they felt 
they had no secure holdings. Uncertainty over the land they cultivate 
forced them to choose immediate benefits over long-term gains. 
Holden and Yohannes (2001) surveyed 500 households in 1997-
98 in 15 different sites that fairly represent diverse ecological areas in 
Central and Southern Ethiopia — Debrezeit and Modjo, Zway and 
Meki, Arsi-Neghele, Mareko and Alaba, Wollaita and Shone, and 
Sidamo and Butajira. Only 17 percent of the households reported 
tenure insecurity. The probability model estimated to identify factors 
that motivated these farmers to perceive insecurity of tenure identifies 
three key factors. Firstly, not all farmers with larger relative farm size 
(as compared to community-specific average) are more tenure 
insecure than those with relatively less land. The relationship is 
instead site-specific. Holden and Yohannes (2001) speculate that some 
farmers with large farm size may have influence in local power 
structure to protect their larger holdings. Secondly, farmers renting out 
land feel less secure because they are not demonstrating continuous 
cultivation of their land, which is a key requirement for maintaining 
possession of PA-land. Thirdly, farmers growing perennial crops feel 
more secured. None of the household characteristics (age, sex, and 
education) and wealth indicators (livestock) were found statistically 
significant to explain why the 17% perceived tenure insecurity while 
83% did not. 
Given that family size is the basic criterion for the equitable 
distribution of land and most land distributions are readjustment of 
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plots instead of complete change of plots, Tekie (2001) hypothesized 
that farm households with a relatively large amount of land relative to 
their family size would expect to give up part of their possession as 
compared to those with smaller holdings relative to their family size. 
The author used a village-mean as a cut-off and hypothesized that 
households with per capital land holdings above village mean would 
be more tenure insecure than those with below-average holdings. 
Using this measure, Tekie (2001) found that the increase in household 
per capita holding above village mean reduces likelihood of investing 
in soil conservation. However, the findings in Holden and Yohannes 
(2001) qualify such a relationship to be location-specific. 
The suggestion that farmers grow perennial crops as a strategy 
for improving security of land rights corroborate with findings from 
other African countries. The evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa 
generally supports that there is a positive relationship between long-
term secured tenure arrangement and investment in land (Place and 
Hazell 1993 for Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda; Lowry and Steinberger 
1991 for Nigeria; Gavian and Fafchamps 1996 for Niger). But, as 
Holden and Yohannes claim, the relation is not one way; increased 
investment in land is also used to establish security of land tenure. 
But the evidence is not conclusive in the Ethiopian context. 
Farmers in parts of Southwest Ethiopia, for example, deliberately 
converted their perennial fields to annual crops for lack of tenure 
security (Tessema, 1994). The opinion-based survey in Yeraswork 
(2000) also concludes that farmers in Wello and North Shewa either 
do not plant trees or destroy their private trees because of fear of 
losing their right to dispose of their own trees. These findings are 
consistent with other descriptive studies (Teferi, 1994; Yigremew, 
2000; Yared, 1995; Aklilu and Tadesse, 1994). On the other hand, the 
findings in Holden and Yohannes (2001) suggest that farmers grow 
perennial crops as a strategy for securing their landholdings. 
Counting the bundles of rights 
Amare (1998) followed a different approach in measuring tenure 
insecurity. The author classified use and transfer rights into short-term 
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(utmost one year) and long-term (no less than one year)". He then 
asked the farmers in Tiyo Woreda of Arsi region to identify the bundle 
of rights they have on each of their plots. The plots with short-term 
use or transfer rights only were categorized into "less secure." Those 
with short as well as long term use or transfer rights were identified as 
"more secure." There were more farmers who perceived tha idea of 
more more unsecured with their long term transfer rights, as compared 
with long-term use rights. 
Paying a premium for certainty 
Tekie (2000) attempted to measure tenure insecurity by how 
much farmers are willing to pay to obtain a secured private ownership 
of land. They are willing to pay more for land with investment, but the 
amount decreases as land size with no investment increases. Similarly, 
they are willing to pay more for land close to their homestead. 
Families with large working adults, however, are less willing to pay 
since they would expect to benefit from the status quo, i.e., continuous 
redistribution of land. The author concludes, based on the empirical 
results, that there are compelling reasons for having a secured 
institutional arrangement for farmers in Ethiopia. 
To sum up, these different measures (perceptions, counting 
bundles of rights) and estimation of certainty premium) provide ways 
of assessing the degree of tenure insecurity. This is a significant 
contribution towards quantifying the effect of tenure insecurity. Those 
holding PA-land are more secured in the short-term than the long-term 
both in use as well as transfer rights, particularly those with smaller 
land holdings. Farmers are willing to pay a premium for certainty on 
their PA-land. Growing perennial crops on PA-land appears to 
strengthen the security of tenure. Farmers are relatively more secured 
on PA-land than short-term rental. Hence, farmers are less willing to 
commit long-term investment on rental plots. 
6 The author classified use rights into short-term (e.g. making free crop choice, fallow 
for one year) long-term (e.g. fallow for more than one year, planting trees, building 
permanent structures such as stone bunds and terraces). Similarly, transfer rights were 
grouped into short term (e.g. right to share out land on a short term contract) and long 
term (e.g. e.g. bequeathing land) 
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Insecurity of tenure limits the degree to which landholders exercise 
their land rights 
Access to land is necessary but exercising rights that come with 
it in effect determines how much a landholder has control over land 
resources, either to use it or it transfer. Insecurity of tenure limits how 
much these legally specified rights (also socially sanctioned) are 
exercised. For example, a landholder who is insecure of long-term 
rights is less likely to commit resources into long-term investment or 
rent-out land on a long-term contract. Because of uncertainty into the 
distant future (either because of ambiguity in specification of the land 
rights or historical experience), some of the land rights are thus left 
unexercised and hence diminishing effectiveness of command over 
using or transferring land resources. 
Even where land rights are legally permissible, transaction costs 
associated with enforcing land rights maybe high to some landholders. 
Either the law or the rules of enforcement are not transparent, or the 
institutions are not in place to effectively enforce the rules. The 
transaction costs for protecting rights to use and transfer land become 
prohibitive and some landholders may opt either to abandon contested 
rights including loss of land or operate on reduced land rights. Where 
enforcement is dependent on one's wealth or connection with local 
power, the poor and socially excluded are more likely to forfeit their 
rights. 
VI Land Quality and Investment 
Land suitable for agriculture represents a small fraction of the total 
land mass. 
About 55 percent of the total land area in Ethiopia constitutes 
moisture-stressed arid and semi-arid areas with less than a four-month 
crop growing period. The land is not suitable or marginally usable for 
rain-fed cultivation because of severe moisture stress. No crops are 
grown in most of these areas or are grown with a high-risk of crop 
failure. Areas with a longer and dependable period with at least 120 
crop growing days are found in the remaining 45 percent of the total 
land area, particularly in the highlands, which account for 22 percent 
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of the total land area (Table 7.1). Within these highlands, however, 
farming is concentrated in the mid-to-high elevation zones with 
topography suitable for human settlement and cultivation, with areas 
with heavy black clay soil. 
Table 6.1: Temperature and Moisture Characteristics of Major Agro-
Ecological Zones (AEZs) 
Moisture 
Regime 
Length of 
growing days 
Temperature Regimes 
(% of total land area) 
Hot to 
Warm 
> 21°C 
Tepid to 
Cool 
11-21°C 
Cold to 
very Cold 
< 11°C 
Arid <45 30.95 0.55 None 
Semi-Arid 46-60 3.29 0.28 None 
Sub-Moist 61-120 11.66 7.62 0.42 
Moist 121-180 13.06 11.20 0.64 
Sub-Humid 181-240 7.45 7.64 0.47 
Humid 241-300 0.90 2.48 0.54 
Per-Humid >300 0.41 0.42 None 
Source : Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection 
Note: The majority of the country's land area is in the lowlands with a liot-to-warm 
thermal zone (67.7%). The remaining areas (32.3%) are in the highlands with cool-
to-cold thermal zones. 
All available estimates of arable land, albeit some variations, 
indicate that arable land with a dependable growing period represents 
a fraction of the total land area (Hurni, 1988; ERS/USDA web site). 
Hurni estimates that only 22 percent of the total land area is arable, 
suitable for farming. The Government of Ethiopia reports a high 
percentage of 38 percent. The recent estimates in ERS/USDA show 
that Ethiopia has nearly 20 percent of its total land in the category of 
"good soils and climate." Compared to other African highlands such 
as Kenya (11.4%), Rwanda (36%), and Malawi (12%), the estimate 
for Ethiopia represents a mid-point in the range. 
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Not only land suitable for agriculture is small, it is degrading 
About half of the highlands in Ethiopia are significantly eroded 
(FAO, 1986). Within the highlands, degradation is more prevalent in 
mid-to-high elevation areas, as compared to the lowlands. Because 
population is distributed within the highlands in an inverted U shape 
by elevation where the peak occurs in mid-elevation with hospitable 
climate (Aynalem, 1987; Mesfin, 1991; Muluneh, 2001), land 
degradation is intense in the mid-elevation due to continuous 
agricultural intensification under population pressure with little 
technological change. 
Figure 6.1 shows the geographical distribution of land 
degradation, as measured by topsoil depth (map reproduced with 
permission from Professor Belay Tegene at Department of Geography 
in Addis Ababa University). Land degradation varies systematically 
across space with severe depletion occurring in highlands areas with 
poor climate (e.g. low and variable rainfall), mountainous topography, 
low inherent soil fertility, long history of population settlement, 
deforestation, overgrazing and intensive crop farming, and recurrent 
droughts and related impoverishment. The areas with extensive soil 
and water erosion are marked by low topsoil, declining soil fertility 
and increased moisture stress and water scarcity. These biophysical 
changes are associated with declining productivity, increased rainfall-
linked production variability and failures, scarcity of land and higher 
rental value, out-migration, and change in attitude towards fertility 
and family size (Tesfaye, Belay and Dessalegn, 2002) 
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Farmers develop good perceptions of degradation of their fields over 
time 
Farmers are generally aware of the severity of soil and water 
degradation (Berhanu 1988; Belay, 1998; Belay, 1992; Ezra, 1997; 
Tekie, 2001). Level of awareness tends to be high among farmers who 
live in areas with more degraded lands, particularly in hilly-
mountainous terrain (Berhanu, 1998; Bekele and Holden, 1998; Tekie, 
2001). Farmers who have plots with topographic features that are 
susceptible to soil erosion (for example, plots with long and steep 
slopes, convex or concave shapes) show greater awareness of soil 
erosion problems (Berhanu 1998; Tekie, 2001). Depth of farm 
knowledge of specific plots that is accumulated through years of 
cultivation enhances the level of awareness (Berhanu, 1998; Tekie, 
2001). Distance of plot from homestead also has a negative effect on 
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level of awareness (Berhanu, 1988; Tekie, 2001). The effect of land 
(plot) size is mixed. Farmers with large plots appear to be more aware 
of soil degradation in Tigray villages (Berhanu, 1988). But, Bekele 
and Holden (1991) find poor farmers with low land per capita who 
tend to perceive greatly the threat of land degradation. 
Extent of soil conservation and improvement are not commensurate 
with the level of awareness 
As the farmers in the north-central highlands of Ethiopia 
reported, they even claim responsibility for improving and 
maintaining their lands (Mesfin 1991). But investments in land 
conservation and improvement are generally low, albeit cases of 
indigenous soil conservation practices (Belay 1992, 1998; Berhanu 
1998). The econometric evidence in Berhanu (1998), Bekele and 
Holden (1998) and Tekie (2001) identify some of the explanations. 
Perception of degradation: Farmers who are aware of the 
severity of land and its impact on current and future productivity are 
more likely to commit resources to improve the productive capacity of 
land (Ervin and Ervin 1992). Such a high level of perception is one of 
the reasons for more farmers applying indigenous conservation 
practices in degraded areas of Ethiopia (Belay 1992 and 1998; 
Berhanu, 1998; Tekie 2001). Farmers invest more in degraded sloped 
plots as long as it is within a gradient range where the expected yield 
exceeds the cost. 
Farm size: Increase in farm size is positively correlated with 
probability of maintaining soil conservation structure (Bekele and 
Holden 1998; Grepperud 1996) and investing in land conservation 
(Berhanu 1998). Such a positive relation between farm size and 
investment suggests that small farmers in Ethiopian are trapped in the 
"Malthusian" predicament albeit their awareness of severity of soil 
erosion. These results for Ethiopia are contrary to the findings in 
studies in other countries. For example, the small farmers in Rwanda 
invest their labor in low-capital intensive conservation practices such 
as grass strips and contour hedgerows (Clay and Reardon, 1997). This 
increase in land investment as farm size decreases is also established 
in studies in Asia (Fedder et al 1988; and Templeton and Scherr, 
1999). 
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Security of tenure: Land with secured long-term tenure provides 
farmers with more incentive to invest. Tenure stability is the key for 
farmers to have increased knowledge of specific plots and devise a 
long-term strategy for land improvement (Berhanu, 1998; Tekie, 
2001). Farmers possessing land per capita that exceeds the average in 
a village are more likely to invest less since they expect their land 
would be taken away in near future (Tekie, 2001). Farmers with short-
term leased land are more likely to discount heavily future benefit and 
invest less. 
Number of economically dependents in a household: The 
econometric evidence from a study of farmers in the central highlands 
of Ethiopia shows that increase in household size, holding 
composition effect constant, reduces the probability of maintenance of 
conservation structure (Bekele and Holden 1998). As more 
dependents, relative to working labor force, increase in a family, the 
pressure for subsistence increases, especially among resource-
constrained poor households. 
Number of working adults in a household: In an environment 
where agriculture is the only or better income generating activity, 
increase in the working force is likely to be associated with the 
adoption of labor-intensive production and land improvement 
practices. For example, small farmers in Rwanda invest twice as much 
as large farmers in labor-intensive soil conservation investments 
(Byiringiro and Reardon, 1996). Farmers In Tigray region of Ethiopia 
who live in remote areas away from road or market places invest more 
labor intensively in land conservation (Berhanu, 1998). 
However, where labor finds a better return outside the agriculture 
sector, it may not sustain the natural resource base for agriculture. As 
the econometric evidence from the Rwanda survey shows, increase in 
the agricultural wage has a positive effect on conservation investment 
and non-agricultural wage has a negative effect on land investments in 
Rwanda (Clay and Reardon, 1997). That is, switching of labor away 
from farming and investing in land occurs as agriculture becomes less 
competitive relative to returns in the non-farm sector. 
Poverty and Risk have a similar disincentive effect: Improving 
the profitability of agriculture and its competitiveness is not enough 
since the incentive to invest depends on expected net incremental 
benefit that accrues in the future, which is a product of the level of 
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profitability and probability of realizing it. In an environment where 
the probability of realizing future benefit is low, farmers are less 
willing to commit resources today for an uncertain future. This 
probability tends to be lower for farmers who have a short time 
horizon due to perceived high risk (assuming these farmers are risk 
averse) and/or poverty. As the findings of Bekele and Holden (1998) 
shows, poor households are less concerned about current rates of soil 
erosion and its future productivity effect, and hence less willing to 
invest in soil conservation structures that take large areas of land out 
of production. 
Investing in off-farm income: The effect of off-farm income on 
land investment follows the same logic applied to labor supply 
decision between farm and non-farm. In an environment where return 
to agriculture is low and subsistence pressure is high, income from 
off-farm employment is to meet consumption need than investing in 
land (Bekele and Holden, 1998; Tekie, 2001). On the other hand, flow 
of private capital is the primary source of intensive land capitalization 
in prospering agriculture in Machakos district in Kenya (Triffin et al, 
1994). Non-farm income has also a positive effect on conservation 
investments in Rwanda (Clay and Reardon, 1997). 
Asset Ownership: Ownership of livestock is a key asset holding 
in rural Ethiopia, notwithstanding the growing problem of scarcity of 
grazing land and pasture. Oxen power is the key input in agricultural 
production. Income from livestock augments consumption and 
production expense and also acts as a substitute for insurance, 
especially in time of crop failure. The evidence on the effect of 
livestock ownership on land investment is mixed. Livestock has a 
negative effect on the perception of a soil erosion threat (Bekele and 
Holden, 1998). The better off farmers, who are not under subsistence 
pressure, see less threat of soil degradation. And since grazing is 
communal, the cost of pasture degradation is less likely to be factored 
by owners of livestock. On the other hand, Tekie (2001) finds a 
positive but weak effect, suggesting wealthier farmers are more likely 
to invest in soil conservation. 
To sum up, farmers in fragile degraded areas are more likely to 
invest in land improvements and their level of awareness is high. Land 
investment is greater on land holdings with stable tenure and own 
operated areas, as opposed to leased land, attracts more investment. 
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However, overcoming insecurity or instability of tenure is one of 
several factors that influences decisions to invest in land. There are 
other factors that are no less important: farm size, presence of working 
labor, ownership of assets, profitability of agriculture, risk and 
poverty, return in non-farm sector, and cohesiveness of communities. 
VII Rental Land Transactions and Factor Equalization 
In an environment where factor markets are functioning, 
household factor endowments such as size of family labor and oxen 
become less important in determining the level of factor use at farm 
level. If land and labor markets functions well, farmers transact their 
lands and labor to equalize their land to labor ratios across farms. The 
same applies to oxen markets. That is, actual land to labor ratio (land 
to oxen ratio) at farm level will be different from land-labor 
endowment ratio since farmers are able to use labor or land markets to 
use factor ratios different than what they are endowed with. For 
example, a farmer who is land constrained is able to cultivate as much 
land as a farmer with the same family labor if he could acquire land 
through the land market. 
PA-based land allocation is driven largely by "equity" 
consideration where every eligible farm-household is provided with 
land, subject to PA specific allocation criteria. The common practice 
of allocating land in proportion to the number of household members 
rarely takes into consideration the ability of households to till land. 
Consequently, there are farmers who hold equal size of PA-land per 
household, but with significant variations in factor intensity, such as 
land per adult labor, land per oxen, and land per working capital. The 
technical ability of peasant associations to anticipate and correct 
changes in factor proportions at farm level is limited. 
The emerging land markets, while still in its infancy, appears to 
provide such venues for equaling factor proportions through trade 
(Bereket and Croppenstedt, 1995; Gavian and Amare 1996). Farmers 
who lease in land are able to increase area of land operated per labor, 
relative to their pre-transaction position. On the same token, farmers 
who lease out and operate on smaller areas of land that matches their 
labor and non-land asset. There is thus a narrowing of non-
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proportionality of land to labor ratio between the transacting 
households. 
Such a process of factor equalization has been established in 
various studies based on the 1994 Arsi rural household survey (Gavian 
and Amare 1996; Gavian and Ehiu, 1996; Ahmed et al 2002). Bereket 
and Croppensedt (1995) also concluded from a survey of agro-
ecologically differentiated sites that sharecropping is acting as a 
vehicle to adjust land size to factor endowments such as land and 
oxen. 
The results presented in Abebe (2000) also show the same 
pattern, but the author describes the process of the land transfer as 
one-way from the poor to non-poor and a mechanism for creating 
"superfluous" labor of the poor. There is no reason, however, for the 
process of equalization to be systematically one way. Secondly, it is 
not always the case that those with more PA-land relative to own-
labor are the only poor. There are both land-constrained (e.g. landless) 
and land-abundant households who are poor and found on both sides 
of the rental land markets. It is plausible though thatthose who lease 
out land are mostly found among the poor who are land abundant 
relative to labor. 
Nevertheless, mindful of the message in Abebe's work, the rental 
land market generally permits a factor equalization process that allows 
farmers to effectively utilize their limiting factor. In the case of land 
constrained households, for example, they are able to get more land to 
fully utilize their labor. The most illustrative case is that of the 
households with no PA-land but manages to get access to land through 
markets and have a positive ratio of land to labor. Similarly, the land 
abundant households are able to use the labor of tenants to have their 
land tilled, especially those who farm jointly with their tenants. 
However, the effectiveness of these land transactions in equalizing 
factor proportions at farm level depends on the flexibility of other 
factor markets to respond to changing incentive [Tesfaye, 1991]. 
Fragmentation of land markets, restrictions on flow of labor, and 
weakness in markets for oxen, credit and insurance limit the extent to 
which these land rental markets perform the equalization function. 
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VIII Area of Land Operated, Quality, Tenure and 
Productivity 
There are different ways in which land influences agricultural 
production. The first is the quantity effect; more land means more to 
output. The second is the quality effect; land with better land quality 
attributes produce more output per unit of physical area of land (e.g., 
output per hectare of land). The third is the tenure effect that governs 
access, use and transfer rights. Tenure effects land productivity 
through intensity in factor use, technical efficiency, technological 
change and change in output mix. Over a long period of time, tenure 
also influences productivity through its impact on today's investment 
in land or enhancing the future productive capacity of land. 
Size of land is the key limiting factor in agricultural production 
Agricultural production is an outcome of a process influenced by 
the level of factor inputs, efficiency and technological change. These 
production enhancing factors may be grouped into: (1) conventional 
(traditional) inputs such as land, labor and capital such as animal 
traction, (2) technical inputs (e.g., fertilizers, improved seeds), (3) 
human capital (age/experience, education, nutritional/health status of 
farm labor), (4) land quality (e.g. soil fertility, land formation, climatic 
variables); and (5) institutional variables such as tenure type. The 
tenure effect works through these different sources of agricultural 
production, i.e., level and quality of factor inputs, technological 
change, and composition of output, such as choice of crops. 
Given the low level of agricultural development in Ethiopia, 
conventional inputs such as land, labor and livestock dominate the 
sources of productivity growth (Ahmed et al 2002; Gebeyehu, 1999; 
Croppenstedt and Abbi, 1996; Abrar, 1996; Asefa and Heidhues, 
1996). Land is by far the most limiting factor in Ethiopian smallholder 
agriculture. The output elasticity estimated range is between 0.32 and 
0.58. As compared to labor, these elasticities are at least three times 
greater than labor, indicating the scarcity of land to labor in general 
(the multiplicative factor maybe less if peak labor is used instead of 
aggregate labor supply across all operations). 
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As farm size decreases, there is a tendency for productivity to 
increase, which is consistent with a widely established inverse 
relation. The explanation for such a relationship in the Ethiopian 
context is not because small farmers are markedly more efficient in 
production than large farms (Gebeyehu, 1999; Croppenstedt and 
Abbi). Nor difference in tenure arrangements (own-operated, share 
tenancy, fixed rental) is sizable by farm size. The most plausible 
explanations are differences in intensity of input use, quality of land, 
and unobserved inputs such as labor management. As farm size 
decreases, farmers tend to use their variable inputs, including using 
fertilizer, intensively (Gebeyehu 1999). Farm size and land quality 
attributes also show a negative correlation (Ahmed et al, 2002; 
Tesfaye and Bedassa, 2001b; Croppenstedt and Abbi). 
Quality of land maters 
Land quality has a significant influence on agricultural 
production. The studies in Abrar (1996), Croppenstedt and Abbi 
(1996), and Ahmed et al (2002) show that land quality attributes have 
a significant production effect. For example, Croppenstedt and Abbi 
estimated an elasticity of output with respect to land quality of 17 
percent at the mean level. Ahmed et al (2002) finds land quality 
elasticity of 0.33 on average - considerably large. Abrar (1996) 
shows that production response to land quality is much stronger where 
the initial land quality is low such as degraded land. Belay (1992) 
qualifies the effect of land degradation on yield by showing a 
quadratic relation where yield decline at the margin reaches its peak in 
the moderately degraded land and then tapers of in severely degraded 
land where yield response approaches zero. 
Another key attribute of land quality is the effect of rainfall, both 
its level and temporal distribution. Rainfall amount and its distribution 
is critical in limiting input particularly in moisture-stressed areas. 
However, few studies exist that establish the statistical relation 
between rainfall and production. As the estimated relationship in 
Gebeyehu (1999) shows, it is not only the amount of rainfall but also 
its distribution that is critical for physical growth and production. 
Estimated yield equations for maize and teff crops with different 
land quality attributes (altitude, slope, soil type, and organic matter in 
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soil) are reported in Table 8.1. The estimated regression coefficients 
confirm the importance of land quality attributes in explaining yield 
differences, holding other factors including technology effect, 
constant. The yield for maize increases with elevation in the 1500 to 
2200 meters above sea level range (ALT) but at decreasing rate 
(ALTSQ). The slope gradient (SLP) has a positive effect within a 
narrowly defined range of 1 to 10 degree gradient. Yield responses are 
different between soil types; higher on the nitosols (DSLU2) as 
compared with the andosols. Maize is grown mostly on nitosols 
(34%), followed by andosols (22%), and cambisols (15%). Because 
organic matter is highest on nitosols, the effect of organic matter that 
exists in soil (OM) is positive but weak. The length of the crop 
growing period has a significant effect on yield, holding the effect of 
altitude constant. The longer the growth period, the higher the yield 
(LCGP) but it occurs at decreasing rate (LCGPSQ). 
All the land quality attributes for "teff ' yield are also statistically 
significant. Yield tends to increase with elevation in the 1700 to 2600 
meters above sea level (ALT) but at decreasing rate (ALTSQ). Length 
of crop growing variables (LCGP, LCGPSQ) is weak when estimated 
with altitude variables included, which suggest that altitude is strongly 
correlated with the length of the crop growing period. When the latter 
is dropped, length of crop growing period becomes statistically 
significant. Yield responses vary by soil type; lower on nitosols 
(DSLU2) as compared with vertisols (DSLU1). Teff is mostly grown 
on vertisols (44%) followed by nitosols (18%) and cambisols (17%). 
Because of low content of organic matter (OM) in vertisols, the effect 
of OM in soil is positive and strong on yield. 
These estimated coefficients of land quality attributes thus 
confirm the importance of land quality in differentiating yield 
responses. And the effect of land quality attributes on yield remains 
strong even in the presence of technology variables that compensate 
for low soil fertility (i.e., improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers) on 
crop yields. That is, observed differences in crop yields due to land 
quality occur independent of technical change. 
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Variables Variable Definition 
Maize Teff 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Model 1 
Coefficient 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
Coef 
(t-ratio) 
ficient 
(t-ratio) 
DSLU2 
Dummy for soils type: 
1=Nitsols, 
O=otherwise 
350.551 
(1.880) 130.132*** (-4.985) 
-132.974*** 
(5.058) 
DSLU3 
Dummy for soil type: 
1=Cambisols, 
O=otherwise 
870.931*" 
(8.268) 
LCGP Length of crop growing period 
33.329 
(1.655) 
3.665 
(1.193) 
12.952"* 
(4.591) 
LCGPSQ 
Length of crop 
growing period 
squared 
-0.113 
(-2.056)* 
-0.0168 
(-1.543) 
-0.046*" 
(-4.562) 
NEWVAR 
Dummy for new 
variety: 
1= New, 0=local 
1333.234*" 
(4.560) 
-40.889 
(-1.353) 
-36.704 
(-1.207) 
SSHOWA 
Region Dummy: 
1 =South Showa, 
O=otherwise 
171.285*" 
(4.127) 
143.594*** 
(3.765) 
ESHOWA 
Region Dummy: 
1 =East Showa, 
O=otherwise 
-803.460*** 
(-3.257) 
160.963*** 
(5.157) 
73.806** 
(2.786) 
WSHOW 
A 
Region Dummy: 
1 =West Showa, 
O=otherwise 
-1576.76"* 
(-9.279) 
62.254** 
(2.759) 
38.098* 
(1.758) 
AA 
Region Dummy: 
1 = Addis Ababa, 
O=otherwise 
114.111*** 
(-3.797) 
-135.788*** 
(-4.717) 
EGOJAM 
Region Dummy: 
1 =East Gojjam, 
O=otherwise 
-315.771 
(-1.781) 
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Variables Variable Definition 
Maize Teff 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Model 1 
Coefficient 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
Coefi 
(t-ratio) 
ficient 
(t-ratio) 
WGOJA 
M 
Region Dummy: 
1 =West Gojjam, 
0=otherwise 
-16.866 
(-0.553) -42.593(-1.579) 
ARSI Region Dummy: 1 =Arsi, O=otherwise 
67.434** 
(1.854) 
27.327 
(0.818) 
CONSTA 
NT Intercept 
-81965*" 
(-7.671) 
3974.331" * 
(-2.992) 
-1803.747 
(-1.429) 
R2 Adjusted R-Square 0.466 0.353 0.343 
F F-Statistics 39.00*** 83.263*** 87.448*** 
N Sample size 827 3310 3310 
Figures in parenthesizes are t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote significance at p<0.001 
or P<0.01 and P<0.05, respectively. The base soil type in the Maize response 
function is Andosols. For the Teff response function it is Cambisols. 
Tenure effect 
The evidence so far indicates there are small differences in 
productivity gap between farms held under different tenure 
arrangements (Gebeyehu, 1990; Gavian and Ehui, 1999; Ahmed et al 
2002). For example, Gavian and Ehui (1999) found a total factor 
productivity (TFP) gap of 10 to 13 percent on land held under fixed 
rental and share contract respectively in the Arsi villages, as compared 
with PA-land. Ahmed et al (2002) found using the same Arsi survey 
data, statistically significant lower yield under share tenancy, but no 
appreciable difference between fixed rental and PA-land. 
On Technical Inefficiency: One possible explanation for the 
productivity gap is differences in technical efficiency among farms 
under different tenures. The econometric evidence in Ahmed (2002) 
shows significant technical inefficiency related to share contract (10 to 
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15 percent lower), holding other efficiency determining factors 
constant such as education (Gebeyehu, 1999; Abay and Asefa, 1996), 
farm size (Gebeyehu, 1999), and market participation (Croppenstedt 
and Abbi 1996). 
There are different possible explanations for lower technical 
efficiency in share tenancy: (1) undersupply of labor effort and/or 
differences in (2) crop composition, (3) quality of land, and (4) farm 
knowledge and skills purely related to tenancy. The findings in 
Gavian and Amare (1996) and Gavian and Ehui (1999) show little 
variation in factor intensity by tenure type, especially in the ratio of 
land to labor. Gavian and Ehui (1999) ascribe the sources of 
differences to technical inefficiency to youth, low farm experience and 
knowledge, and quality attributes of land of tenant farmers. However, 
Ahmed et al (2002) find, from the same data, a different source of 
technical inefficiency, i.e., under supply of seedling and weeding 
labor in sharecropped plots as compared to own-operated or fixed 
rental plots. Restrictions on input-output decisions of sharecroppers 
limit their level, intensity and timing of labor supply. 
Whilst there exist some inefficiencies related to tenancy, the 
evidence on explaining sources of technical inefficiency is thus 
inconclusive. The explanation that tenure-related productivity 
difference is due to land quality cannot be conclusively established 
since the relation between land quality and tenure is contingent on 
motive for land transaction and type of land contract. Some farmers 
may use the rental market to "weed" out inferior quality of land and 
hence there exists a negative relation between land quality and rental 
land. However, there are also farmers who are unable to cultivate and 
choose to share out their best land. 
It is plausible that inefficiency arises from low farm experience 
and knowledge as evident in Gavian and Ehui (1999). These factors 
may partly capture the effect of unobserved factors. But the effect of 
other human capital attributes such as education cannot be emphasized 
as explaining variation in technical inefficiency since the findings in 
Croppenstedt and Abbi (1996) and Gebeyehu (1990) show that there 
are no substantial differences in human and physical capital between 
tenant farmers and own-operators. 
While the Marshallian inefficiency exists, as shown in Ahmed et 
al (2002) where share cropping is an inferior contract from efficiency 
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perspective, it is at least of an empirical interest to establish the extent 
of such inefficiency in different Ethiopian settings. Given the presence 
of large technical inefficiency regardless of tenure type in Ethiopia, 
the inefficiency that arises from share tenancy may not be as strong. 
Moreover, farm communities in Ethiopia choose share tenants who 
have knowledge of farming and a reputation for trustworthiness. 
While the cost of supervision is non-zero, the social penalty of labor 
shirking is high and hence the loss in efficiency due to undersupply of 
effort may not be substantial. 
On Agricultural Technology: So far, the analyses of technical 
efficiency assumes that farmers, regardless of tenure type, face the 
same production frontier but operate at different points within a 
production frontier. If such an assumption is relaxed, then productivity 
differences may arise between tenure types due to variation in the 
adoption of agricultural technology. 
Holden and Yohannes (2001) tested if tenure insecurity 
negatively affects intensity of purchased technical inputs (seeds, 
fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides) using survey data from central 
and Southern Ethiopia. They estimated a two-stage regression model 
where a Probit model estimated in stage one to predict the probability 
of using purchased farm inputs and then OLS was estimated with 
correction for selection bias. The tenure insecurity variable was not 
significant in the decision whether to purchase or not (stage one), as 
well as in the intensity model (stage two). The authors find no 
significant inefficiency spilling over the use of purchased farm inputs 
due to share-tenancy arrangement. They also conclude that effects on 
short-term production decisions through rental market are not 
significant. 
Using a different and older data set from villages in Southern 
Ethiopia, this author estimated a Tobit regression model to test if 
intensity of fertilizer use differs between staple crop (maize) and cash 
crop (Teff in the survey villages). The regression results show that 
intensity of fertilizer use is positive with respect to land quality 
attributes (intensity is high on red/black soils and less eroded land), 
ownership of livestock (those unconstrained by subsistence 
requirement tends to apply more amount per area), use of improved 
seed (predicted variable), and presence of service cooperatives (where 
there is physical access to fertilizer). On the other hand, intensity of 
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fertilizer use is negative with respect to area (intensity is higher on 
small farms), and nutrient-grain price ratio (responsive to price effect). 
Farmers using rental land (a predicted variable) for Teff, the main 
staple crop that is commonly grown on rented plots, use fertilizer 
intensively as compared to maize plots. Hence the conclusion in 
Holden and Yohannes (2001) is generally plausible but may not hold 
for all crops. 
On Output Mix: The studies so far do not capture the effect of 
crop composition on explaining productivity difference between own-
operated and tenured farms since there are no appreciable differences 
in composition of output in predominantly cereal crop growing areas, 
as in the Arsi survey. However, such variation is strong in farming 
systems where perennial crop growing is common. Since the majority 
of rental contracts are short-term, farmers concentrate on annual crops. 
Permanent crops such as coffee, chat, and 'Enset' are rarely grown in 
rental lands. Hence, there are yield differences (measured in real 
monetary value) between farmers operating their own PA-lands where 
perennial crops are grown and rental lands where only annual crops 
dominate. 
Table9.2: Tobit Regression Estimates 
Teff Maize 
(Absolute t-coefficients in parenthesis) 
Soil type 10.13* 2.82 
(Red/Black/Sandy) -4.48 (1.42) 
Erosion index -18.52* -7.56** 
(3.98) (2.03) 
Land rented 11.11 ** -2.84 
(2.08) (0.50) 
Area cropped (ha) 2.44 -12.45 *** 
(0.54) (1.79) 
Livestock 0.01 * 0.01 * 
(in TLSU) (2.70) (2.95) 
Household head 0.94 2.95 ** 
Education (0.70) (2.26) 
Household head -0.25 0.18 
Age (1.19) (0.94) 
Amount of improved 0.79* 0.54* 
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Teff Maize 
(Absolute t-coefficients in parenthesis) 
seed per ha (kg/ha) 
Nutrient-grain 
price rate 
Presence of farm 
cooperative (1 yes) 
Village effect 
(6.65) 
-39.45 
(7.08) 
16 .56* 
(3.04) 
28 .79** 
(1.58) 
-38.82 ** 
(2.01) 
(4.20) 
- 8 1 . 5 8 * 
(4.04) 
8.41 
Constant 
(2.06) 
-30.57 
(2.04) 5 3 . 6 9 * 
(3.23) 
3 8 . 1 9 * 
(20.24) 
Sigma 3 8 . 3 6 * 
(16.61) 
N O T E 
* Significant at 1% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 10% 
IX Land and Poverty Correlations 
This section first identifies the paths connecting land to poverty. 
Secondly, it emphasizes that overcoming poverty requires, in addition 
to equitable distribution of land, improving productivity of land in 
such a way that incremental income is distributed more than 
proportionately to the poor. However, rising land rents may offset the 
productivity and income gains. Finally, land alone is not a sufficient 
predictor of poverty as evident from the determinants of poverty. 
Connecting Land to Poverty 
Poverty is defined here in terms of inadequacy of income or 
consumption of basic needs such as food. Poverty in rural Ethiopia is 
widespread and deep, and high even by African levels. The poor are 
large in household size with more dependents. They are primarily 
engaged in low-return self-employment, particularly in agriculture. 
They have an income that is largely spent on food, but is still not 
sufficient to meet their food requirements for a healthy and productive 
life. Inadequate provisioning of food also correlates with poor 
nutritional child and adult nutrition. 
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A typical income portfolio of rural households comprises of 
diversified income sources, but agriculture is the primary source of 
employment, production and subsistence. Because the majority of the 
poor are primarily engaged in agricultural activities, poverty in rural 
areas is largely related to low productivity of farm labor, which in turn 
is related to small farm size, poor quality of land (soil fertility in 
particular), low rate of application of improved technology, shortage 
of capita (for example, traction animal), poor health and labor supply 
conditions, and constrained access to agricultural markets because of 
weak road infrastructure and service providing institutions. 
Studies on determinants of poverty largely identify these same 
factors as poverty determinants in rural Ethiopia confirming the 
dominance of agriculture in rural livelihoods. As the studies in 
Gobeze (1999), Deracon and Krishnan (1998), and Mekonen, Abebe, 
Bereket (1999) show, the probability of being poor is statistically 
related to subsistence farming or low-return non-farm occupations, 
living in marginal agroecology with poor agricultural potential, 
physical inaccessibility, absence of working adults with good health 
within households, old age, being female-headed, shortage of assets 
for agricultural production (land and oxen), low educational 
attainment, and producing mainly non-tradable staple crops. Gobeze 
(1999) suggests that there is a minimum land size to separate the poor 
from the non-poor. Mekonnen, Abebe and Bereket (1999) find that it 
is not land size per se but its quality such as whether the land is used 
for cash crops or not that explains the probability of escaping poverty. 
Land connects to poverty in different ways. As the studies on 
rural poverty and production function establish, the major path way is 
through land-production-income-consumption links. Land is a limiting 
factor in production, both its quantity and quality. Access to land, 
particularly to good quality land, increases production, more strongly 
than other factor inputs. The effect of increase in agricultural 
production is passed on poverty reduction (or, more generally on 
welfare) through different conduits: (1) increases on-farm production 
and wage employment in agriculture; (2) change in food price; and (3) 
indirect through demand stimulus effect of agricultural growth on 
non-tradable non-farm sector and associated increases in employment 
(both self as well as wage). 
4 6 
Land also has a collateral value and hence enables landholders to 
gain access to credit or cash to meet production and consumption 
needs. Farm households with land are better positioned to get access 
to loan in informal credit markets. Or, they can use their land as a 
substitute for credit such as requiring a cash deposit as a condition for 
renting land. 
The land-poor are more likely to be deprived of such basic 
services as educational attainment and health services. Hence, they 
tend to be undernourished with a high health risk. They are also 
poorly connected in community networks and decisions that are 
critical to their livelihoods. Often the burden is greater on poor 
women, who are disproportionately poor because of absence of 
working adults and assets (physical, financial and social). Relaxing 
land constraint thus increases the capability of poor households to gain 
better access to social services and community support networks. 
Overcoming Poverty Requires More than the Distribution of Land 
The most significant contribution of land reform policy so far has 
been the equitable distribution of land. More than 90 percent of farm 
households have access to land, albeit declining in size and quality. 
Countries that start economic growth from less unequal distribution of 
assets, land in particular, tend to grow faster than countries with more 
unequal land distribution (Deininger and Squire, 1998). Provided that 
emerging tenure systems are not inflexible for land markets to operate 
efficiently, Ethiopia is better positioned today for rapid broad-based 
agriculture-led economic growth. 
However, with farm size declining, farmers have to strongly 
increase their level of land productivity through increased cultivation 
intensity, improved efficiency, and technical change. Increased 
productivity, particularly of food staples, goes a long way in 
addressing food insecurity and poverty since food security is 
essentially a food production problem for the majority of the farmers. 
Since farmers rarely consume all they produce, part of their produce is 
sold to convert production to improved cash income. The net income 
gain through such market-mediated conversion depends on the scale 
of their trade and profit margin (price less costs of production and 
transfer). For farmers to benefit from increase in productivity, it is 
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crucial they have physical access to markets at low transaction costs 
through improved marketing infrastructure and institutions that deliver 
inputs and finance, and market output at low cost. Reduction in costs 
of production and marketing through technological change and 
marketing infrastructure are necessary to enlarge markets and 
overcome problems of non-tradability and an associated sharp decline 
in price in time of increase in production in demand-constrained 
markets. 
Increased productivity and real cash income need to be coupled 
with measures to reduce year-to-year fluctuations in production, 
which are recurrent in Ethiopian rain-fed agriculture, particularly in 
low-rainfall moisture-stressed areas. Here transitory poverty is high 
involving large segments of rural population entering in and out of 
poverty depending on the variability of their harvest. The recent trends 
in famine-prone areas point that there are more people getting into 
poverty and staying longer because of the depletion of their assets in 
the process of coping recurrent production failures. 
As shown above for the case of increase in agricultural 
production through area expansion (or, greater access to cultivable 
land), the benefits of increase in land productivity are not limited to 
improved on-farm productivity. They are also channeled through the 
food market (i.e., change in food price) and labor market (i.e., increase 
in wage employment). Poverty reduction through area expansion and 
productivity growth is maximized if growth occurs in ways that 
redistributes the incremental income more than proportionately to the 
poor. 
Rising Land Rent May Partly Offset Productivity and Income Gains 
For tenant farmers who depend on rental land for cultivation, 
only part of the increase in agricultural output or income is shared. 
The net income gain due to the tenants depends on the area of land 
rented, increment in land productivity, and output and cost sharing 
arrangements. Whilst the rental land markets appear to equalize 
distribution of landholdings, their effect on income distribution could 
be disequalizing if rental rates rise to offset the gain from improved 
productivity. 
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In the land-constrained environment of Ethiopia, rental rate rises 
with the increase in land scarcity. For example, rental rate has 
historically increased from one-third to 50:50 in output shared. As 
land becomes scarce, those who lease out land demand tenants to 
contribute a large share of variable inputs. In some instances cash 
advance is required to get access or to continue farming. To the extent 
that the tenants start from a low-income position and rising rents 
redistribute income to renters, the net income gain from agricultural 
production and productivity growth is diminished. 
Land alone is not a sufficient predictor of Poverty 
Whilst land and poverty is negatively correlated, such a relation 
may not always hold because of the nature of land distribution, the 
tenancy arrangement, and meaning of landless in rural Ethiopia as 
commonly used. Using PA-land alone, for example, has a limited use 
in identifying poor households. There are today "PA-land abundant' 
households who possess land but who are income or consumption 
poor because they lack labor, oxen, and finance. If PA-land size alone 
is used to identify the poor, it is plausible that a land abundant widow 
without family labor, farming experience and physical and financial 
assets maybe classified as non-poor. Similarly, there are also land-
constrained farmers with adequate non-land resources (labor, oxen 
and access to credit) who may be classified wrongly as poor. 
The conventional association of poverty with tenancy is not quite 
applicable to the Ethiopian context. Unlike the Asian countries where 
there exists a wage labor-tenant-owner operator ladder that 
systematically mirrors poverty rankings in descending order, there is a 
reverse type of tenancy in the Ethiopian context. It is because the 
tenants are not the commonly characterized economically 
disadvantaged who are located at the bottom of labor-tenant-owner 
operator ladder. Some of those who rent in land are land-constrained 
but not in size of working labor, assets and ability to finance. These 
"tenants" often seek more land area to operate through exchanging 
their labor or oxen or advancing credit. And those who are efficient 
producers are likely to improve their living standards and move up on 
the social mobility ladder. The "landowners" possess large land 
because they have large family size but some may not possess the 
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ability to farm because of lack of assets. They are not the ones that 
command economic and social power in rural areas. 
While in a majority of cases rural households without PA-land 
(the "landless" as often referred to in Ethiopian literature may fall into 
the category of the poor, there are emerging young entrepreneur part-
time farmers who are not poor. In South Wollo, for example, some of 
the newly established young families are engaged in non-farm activity 
to generate cash to build farm capital such as oxen and cash for 
renting land. Some grow high-value crops by combining seasonally 
differentiated farming and non-farming activities, and manage to 
escape poverty and move upward. 
The econometric based studies on rural poverty confirm that land 
is only one of several factors. This is also confirmed in community-
based opinion surveys where farmers were asked to identify poverty 
indicators in their communities (see, for example, Aklilu and 
Dessalegn, 2002; Abbute, 2001). They relate their physiological and 
social deprivations to a variety of interacting factors, i.e., physical 
environment (climate, land formation, soil type), poor nutrition and 
health, lack of adequate physical and financial capital, particularly 
land, oxen and finance, little economic access to adopt and use new 
agricultural technology, and lack of a market outlet. Paradoxically, 
there are no better routes for these poor farmers to escape out of 
poverty other than farming. 
X Land Scarcity, Competition and Labor Mobility 
The competition for scarce agricultural land has physical, 
economic and social expressions. A common physical expression is 
the diminution of quality-adjusted land holdings. Other physical 
expressions of land scarcity are, for example, decline in the carrying 
capacity of land, change in land cover from grazing and forestlands to 
cropland, decline in area under common property resources, and the 
increased distance to forest or water points. The economic expression 
is in terms of rising rental value of land such as increased cash rental, 
increased output share of lesser and/or lowering share of variable 
inputs and/or tightening conditions to right to lease land such as cash 
deposit or providing guaranteed labor in time of the peak farm season. 
The social dimension takes such forms as the increased work burden 
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on women to fetch water and forest products and migration. This brief 
section dwells on the migration dimension of land scarcity and 
competition since this historically important mechanism for easing 
land distribution is glossed over in the current literature in Ethiopia. 
Population tends to concentrate in areas where climate and land are 
suitable for living and subsistence production 
The majority of the population is rural and located mainly in the 
highlands (>1500masl), which account for 34 percent of the total land 
area but home for more than 85 percent of the total population. Within 
the different highland ecosystems, the population is vertically 
distributed (Mesfin, 1991). The population concentration is highest in 
the middle-elevation zone ("Woina Dega" agro-climatic zone), which, 
as in the case of Table 11.1, lies in the 1800-2600 masl with 67 
percent of the population occupying close to 32 percent of the total 
land area. This zone has the most hospitable climate with land 
resources suitable to grow a large variety of crop and livestock species 
(Mesfin, 1991). 
Table 11.1: Vertical d istribution of the Ethiopian population in 1984 
Altitude zone (masl) Percent of area Percent of population 
Above 2600 5.8 10.4 
1800-2600 31.8 67.1 
1400-1800 28.1 11.5 
1000-1400 13.4 8.2 
Below 1000 21.5 2.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Aynalem, 1987 
Location specific studies, especially the findings in Mesfin 
(1991) detail the vertical distribution of the population in northern 
Shewa and Southern Wello, and correlate it with farming practices, 
intensity of land degradation and the migration pattern. In the "Woina 
Dega" zone, population density and crop diversity reach their 
maximum and then taper off in the "Dega zone". 
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The same pattern of vertical distribution of the population is 
reported in Western Gurageland (Muluneh, 2001). As the table below 
shows, the population in West Gurageland is concentrated in the 
"Woina Dega" agro-climatic zone (1700-2400 masl) and "Dega" zone 
(2400-3200 masl), which jointly account for 80 percent of the total 
land area and 92 percent of the population. The respective population 
densities are 285 and 310 persons per square kilometer. 
Table 11.2: Vertical distribution of the Population of West 
Gurageland in 2000 
Altitude zone 
(masl) 
Percent of 
area 
Percent of 
population 
Population 
density 
Persons per 
km2 
Above 3200 1 2.3 495 
2400-3200 32 41.9 319 
1700-2400 48 50.5 285 
Below 1700 19 5.2 67 
Source: Muluneh, 2001 
Out-migration is a way to ease population pressure on land and 
spread livelihood risk across geographical space 
According to the latest 1994 population census, most of the 
migration is rural, and rural to rural migration accounts for 49 percent 
of the total migrants. The history of migration shows that regions in 
the north, northwest, northeast, and central-south (i.e., the densely 
populated "enset" growing areas) are areas of net out-migration. On 
the recipient end are the regions in southwest, southeast and central. 
Ethiopia in most cases these are economic migrants pushed by land 
degradation and under population pressure and poverty. 
In addition to such a migration involving traversing long-
distances, people migrate short-distances. The findings in Mesfin 
(1991), which cover the administrative regions of Shewa and Wello, 
show a vertical distribution of population that increases with 
elevation. It reaches its maximum in the 2600-2800 m zone, which 
accounts for 20 percent, and then tapers off. Despite the fact that the 
climate in the 2200-2600 m zone is moderate and favorable for human 
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population and suitable to grow a large variety of crops, population 
density is higher in the colder, 2600-3000 m belt. Farmers are slowly 
abandoning the elevation zone 2000-2400m as they find the landscape 
rugged, and the land dissected and suffers from severe gully and water 
erosion. They move upwards (2600-3000m) where there are more flat 
and undulating plateaus that are suitable for cultivation. Some migrate 
to the lowlands in spite of problems of low and erratic rainfall, and a 
high risk of drought. 
The population in South Wello is growing at a rate of 3 percent 
per annum with the density averaging from 150 to 350 persons per 
square kilometer. The rapid population growth and declining 
availability of arable land is pushing an increasingly number of the 
population in the highlands to reside in very fragile and marginally 
productive land with slopes exceeding 30 percent, very shallow soils, 
and short growing seasons (Belay, 2000b). In addition, some travel 
from the degraded highlands to the adjacent lowlands. The 
geographical space that is often encroached upon is the interface 
between the highlands and the lowlands; space that customarily has 
been used or claimed by pastorlist and communities. 
Distant migration has diminished in recent years because of the 
constrained mobility of labor. For most farmers, the cost of migration 
is high relative to expected employment opportunity and return. 
Secondly, the permanent residency requirement of the land policy 
closes the option of migrating for work away from place of origin. 
Thirdly, the current aggregation of people by ethnicity and drawing 
administrative boundaries further restrict mobility of labor because of 
territorial claim and restriction of access to land by ethnicity and 
associated conflicts. 
The deceleration of labor mobility means that the important role 
of migration as a way to ease land pressure by equalizing factor 
proportionality between land and people is missed. Such a role is 
important since land is immobile and the only way to equalize land 
holdings across geographical space is through migration. As labor 
mobility is restricted, using migration as a way to pool climatic risk 
through spatial diversification of livelihood also diminishes. This is 
particularly an important income smoothing strategy for people in 
drought-prone areas, who, without long-migration, are confined to 
local income sources that often co-vary positively. 
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It is also a fact that economic growth in rural areas is bound to 
occur at different rates between regions. Growth is likely to occur 
more in regions with better climate, natural resources and developed 
markets. Growth spreads between regions through commodity trade 
and labor mobility. Labor moves where better employment 
opportunity exists and thereby equalizes wage (or, income) across 
space. The regions lagging in growth are likely to benefit from the 
lowering of food prices, improved local wages, and transfer of income 
from migrant labor. The current tendencies towards restricting labor 
mobility and pushing rural growth in low-potential areas at high social 
cost are devoid of economic rationality from inter-temporal 
perspective. 
XI Common Property Resources Under Population And 
Poverty Pressure 
Aside from individualized landholdings, there are key land 
resources that are largely common property: pasture, water sources 
(rivers, streams and lakes), and forests. These are the main resources 
for grazing, water and fuel. In addition, these environmental goods are 
important sources of household assets such as housing and cash 
income from sale of collected grass and forest products. The rural 
households at large benefit from these environmental goods and 
services, but the poor are disproportionately more dependent. 
These resources are collectively owned (or, held) and managed. 
The use of these resources is not excludable (or, its cost relative to its 
return is high to define boundaries akin to privately owned property). 
However, it follows, unlike public goods, that the use of the resource 
by one member subtracts its availability by others (the law of 
subtractibility). In addition, as in the case of the rangeland where the 
variability of production is large, the boundaries need to be defined 
over a large geographical space with a flexibility to allow mobility to 
pool climatic risk. 
Within the boundaries of the commons, the rights to common 
resources are vested in groups or communities that claim legitimacy to 
statutory and/or customary laws. There are rules for members that 
govern access, modality of utilization, distribution of benefits, and 
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transfer of use rights. Non-members are excluded except where there 
is a negotiated reciprocal arrangement. 
Per capita availability of common property resources is on decline 
both in quantity and quality 
Quantity dimension: The overall trends albeit some recovery 
indicate considerable declines in areas under common property 
resources. For example, studies on the history of land cover change 
show expansion of cropland and shrinkage in pastureland and natural 
forests over the last 30 to 40 years (Belay, 2002; Engdawork, 2000; 
Gete, 2000; Kebrom and Hedlund, 2000; Muluneh, 1994 and 2000; 
Solomon, 1994). However, the extent and intensity of the land cover 
change vary between geographical areas with a different history of 
population settlements, agro-ecological characteristics, farming 
systems and paths of agricultural growth (or lack of it). 
In the northern highlands where crop cultivation has a long 
history, the deforestation process was more or less completed before 
the 1950s or earlier and there is little vegetation cover to be removed 
now. There is very little land for expansion of crop cultivation as 
every piece of land with some soil has already been converted long 
time ago (Mesfin, 1991; Belay, 2002; Kebrom and Hedlund, 2000). 
The completion of the process of increases in cropland and decline in 
vegetation cover has a relatively recent history in the northwestern 
highlands. As of the 1980s all land suitable for cultivation has been 
converted (Gete, 2000; and Gete and Hurni, 2001). The remaining 
natural forest areas are located primarily in the south and southwest of 
the country. However, the expansion of agriculture and settlements 
have caused disturbance to closed high forests in these parts of the 
country (Reusing, 1998). 
Quality dimension: As grazing land shrinks in relation to the 
size of livestock population, the pressure on pastureland mounts. 
Farmers change their livestock management practices in response to 
the contraction of pastureland such as adjusting stock size, splitting 
their herds and sending some to distant areas, and overgraze existing 
pastureland. Overgrazing and moving to marginal areas exposes land 
to greater erosion risk and deterioration of common pastures. The 
process of deforestation also raises erodibility of soil since the 
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functions of plant roots to physically bind soil particles and stabilize 
soil, enhance water conservation by creating pores in soil surface to 
enable water infdtration, and vegetative cover to intercept and 
dissipate raindrop and reduce velocity of surface runoff weaken as tree 
and vegetative cover declines. 
Conversion to crop cultivation has increased soil erodibility since 
soil loss is significantly higher on cultivated land as compared to land 
under perennial crops and woody vegetation (Hurni, 1988). And, as 
arable land becomes scarce, poor farmers are increasingly reducing 
crop diversity with increased emphasis on cereal crops as sources of 
food and cash to farm households. Such switching from perennial 
crops and pasture to annual crops raises risk of soil erodibility since 
such crops require intense tillage that often occurs during the rainy 
season when crop fields are devoid of vegetative cover. 
The explanations for declining trends are often sought in their 
correlates 
The declining trends in quantity and quality of common-pool 
resources are correlated with the biophysical environment 
(topography, climate, soil type), population growth and its 
distribution, paths and sources of agricultural development, evolving 
tenure arrangements, and change in public policy. 
• Increased aridity, frequent droughts and degradation of natural 
resource effectively reduce the availability of common pastures 
and water resources, particularly in arid and semi-arid areas 
where extensive and mobile pastoral livelihood systems prevail. 
• Rapidly growing population and labor force: Rapid population 
growth increases demand for food, fiber and energy while at the 
same time lowering cost of labor relative to land. In an 
environment of low agricultural technology, increase in 
agricultural production occurs through expanding land frontiers by 
pushing cultivation onto marginal areas including encroachment 
of pastoral lands for farming, converting permanent pastures and 
forest lands into intensive croplands, and intensifying land use. 
* Forest products, especially fuel wood, are the main sources of 
household energy consumption. 85% of the total energy comes 
from biomass. With the increase in population that is poor and 
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dependent on natural resources for livelihood, national high 
forests and plantations are encroached upon and cleared for fuel 
wood and charcoal production for home consumption and cash 
generation, and grazing. 
• Erosion of indigenous common property resource management 
systems, decline in collective action for sustainable use of 
common grazing and water resources, deterioration into open 
access akin to the prediction of the "tragedy of the commons" 
(e.g., widespread destruction of community forests in most parts 
of the country during 1991-93 as shown in Yeraswork, 2000 and 
Pankhurst, 2001). 
• Deliberate government land tenure and use policy such as the 
individualization of common pool resources (for example, ye wel 
meret kifilfil in the Amhara region as a way to meet the dual 
objectives of providing land to individual claimants and an 
incentive to conserve natural resources). 
» Failed state in provision of better substitutes for indigenous 
institutions for effective and sustainable management of common 
property resources, conflict prevention and resolution, and 
protecting the interests of competing land users particularly the 
pastoral population. 
• Poverty and livelihood insecurity: Poor farmers are less likely to 
invest in soil conservation and improvement in an environment 
where poverty is widespread and serious. Even if farmers are 
aware of the effect of soil erosion, their incentive to invest is low 
because of their low valuation of a future income stream. Such a 
discounting of the future is particularly heightened in common-
pool resources where tenure arrangement for the commons is 
weak. 
Changing tenure arrangements and efficacy 
Managing common property resources was vested in indigenous 
tenure arrangements that pre-existed the 1975 land reform, which 
transferred ownership of land to the state and land administration to 
state functionaries The indigenous tenure systems managed common 
pool resources through the delineation of defined boundaries, 
restricting access to members with legitimate ancestral claims, 
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enforcing customary rules and practices in the use of commons and 
sharing benefits, excluding non-members except through negotiated 
reciprocal arrangement, and prevention and resolution of conflicts. 
These indigenous tenure systems have eroded over the years and 
newly state-mandated institutions are emerging. These new 
institutions face shrinking common pool resources amidst increased 
production risk that call for a system that economizes and allocates 
scarce resources equitably and efficiently, manages risk effectively, 
enhances conditions for collective action, and avoids conflict over 
claims to resources. 
There are three dominant types of tenure arrangements today that 
co-exist in rural Ethiopia: (1) unrestricted common pool resources 
akin to an open access; (2) restricted common poor resources (e.g., 
restricted grazing and forest areas in the sedentary highlands and 
rangelands in pastoral area), and (3) individualization of hillsides and 
enclosed areas. In the agro-pastoral system, which is a transition zone 
between the sedentary to pastoral systems, the sedentary farmers are 
engaged in a variety of reciprocal arrangements with the pastoral 
population. In the Afar areas, for example, some of the animals are 
sent to the Afar land in the wet season when community-based 
grazing lands are closed. The Afar returns the animals at the end of the 
wet season and they are allowed to graze in the community pasture 
during the dry season. 
The unrestricted tenure arrangement is prevalent under 
conditions where properties characterizing common property 
resources are absent (e.g. defined boundaries, rules of access and 
exclusion, and enforcement) or ineffective (i.e., individuals act 
independently to maximize utility or benefit without regard to 
externality effect). The widespread deforestation in 1991-93 or the 
deterioration of the indigenous pastoral systems is an example of open 
access akin to Harding's "tragedy of the commons". 
The restricted common property resources exist in different 
forms: restricted grazing area, community forestry, and rangelands in 
pastoral areas. Although the restricted areas are accessible to defined 
community members and penalties are imposed for breaking the rules, 
there is some degree of flexibility in the use of the resources. 
Typically, no grazing is allowed in the wet season in enclosed areas 
except for some preferential access to members. Non-members are 
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strictly excluded. However, seasonal switching of tenure regime 
occurs in dry season under a variety of arrangements such as open 
access to members only, negotiated access to non-members, and open 
access to all. 
These are either under customary management that claims its 
legitimacy to kinship or territory or state-controlled area-based 
management. Examples of the customary arrangements are the 
traditional forest management system narrated in Yeraswrok (2000) or 
the clan-based pastoral systems that exist in de facto today but are 
weakening. For example, among the Afar pastoral population in 
northeast Ethiopia, pastoral lands are traditionally delineated into clan 
lands and managed by clan elders (Getachew, 2001). Clan members 
have rights to access to clan land, use in accordance to established 
customary practices, and transfer to their heirs. The clan leaders are 
entrusted to exclude non-clan members save through negotiated 
reciprocal agreement, and prevent or resolve conflicts. 
The effectiveness of these indigenous tenure systems, however, 
has been undermined by policies of state ownership of land and 
supplanting the traditional land administration and authority by state 
controlled functionaries, and processes of encroachment of pastoral 
areas and individualization of the commons. Whilst the pastoral 
territory is contracting, conditions of aridity and decline in vegetation 
are causing an increased variability in range production. These two 
forces call for greater protection of customary rights to clan lands, 
enhanced utilization of scarce pastoral resources, and enforcement of 
flexibility in application of rules of non-exclusion that allows mobility 
of the pastoral population. The conflicting objectives between the 
demands of the pastoral population for greater precision and 
enforcement of pastoral areas and the processes of encroachment of 
the pastoral areas often translate into frequent conflicts between the 
pastoral population and the state, between herders, and herders and 
farmers. 
These different tenure systems represent a continuum of 
arrangements that could have a profound effect on the performance 
and sustainability of the common property resources. Questions that 
arise, for example are why these systems co-exist in the same 
geographical area? How effective are these different tenure 
arrangements in terms of equitable access to resources, efficient 
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utilization, and sustainability? What happens to the poor and socially 
excluded individuals when common property resources become scarce 
under these arrangements? What are the conditions for effective 
collective action? 
The empirical evidence is generally thin in addressing these basic 
questions. The exceptions are the works in Yeraswork (2000) and 
Berhanu et al (2000a and 200b), which shed some insights on 
favorable conditions for collective action. In explaining the reasons 
for survival of natural forests amidst widespread destruction of 
community forests in 1991-93, Yeraswork (2000) identifies at least 
four factors favorable for collective action: (1) presence of simple and 
transparent rules that govern access and use of common pool 
resources that are rooted in traditions and have evolved over time; (2) 
flexibility in rules to changing scarcity condition; (3) homogeneity of 
community members (boundaries are easily defined, greater assurance 
and low incidence of shirking, and easily adaptable to changing 
conditions); and (4) low access to markets and commercialization. The 
case studies in Berhanu et al (2000a and 200b) qualify the effect of 
population size on collective action, i.e., it follows an inverse U 
relationship where both small or large population sizes are not 
favorable for collective action. Other conditions that are not favorable 
for collective action are wealth heterogeneity, low social capital, and 
openness to trade and market access. These studies suggest that 
common property resources are bound to diminish in importance as 
rural areas become more open and commercialized, population size 
enlarges, wealth differentiation increases, and tenure arrangements are 
not flexible to changing scarcity conditions. 
XII Land and Gender 
It cannot be assumed that land issues are gender-neutral, albeit 
scarcity of empirical evidence, especially in relation to land access and 
control, dependency on rental markets, security of tenure, agricultural 
productivity, and poverty. There are different levels of disaggregating 
gender. Often, the focus is on comparing male-headed and female-
headed household heads. The latter may be categorized into de jure 
and de facto female-headed households. Such a level of analysis fails 
to capture potential gender differentiation within households. As 
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pointed out in Zenebework and Yared (2001), there is very little 
research-based information on intra-household issues in general, and 
gender in particular. 
In addition, the quantitative analysis linking gender to land is 
often based on bivariate analyses. For example, comparing land size to 
family size without controlling for other conditioning factors that are 
wrongly captured by a gender variable may yield erroneous 
conclusions. But there are only few studies based on a regression 
framework. A caution is thus in order in reading existing evidence and 
attributing cause and effect relations. 
Female households face fewer modes of access to land 
PA lands in most parts of the country are commonly allocated to 
head of households but not to individual members. In most of the 
cases, household heads are male and they receive PA-land as 
representatives of their families. In principle, husband and wife are 
jointly responsible for the use and transfer of rights in PA-land. 
Generally, ease of access to PA-land land by female-headed 
households is conditional on availability of land for male-headed 
households. Where supply of land is tight, access to land appears to be 
easier for male-headed households than female-headed farm 
households. The percentage for female holders increases only where 
the supply of land is less constrained. 
There are exceptions though. For example, in Tigray region, a 
'share', the amount of land that each adult should receive in a 
particular community, is first determined. Each adult, regardless of 
gender, receives one share. Children, up to a pre-set number per 
household, are given fractional shares (Tigray Regional State Council, 
Negarit Gazette, 1997; Bruce, Hoben and Dessalegn Rahmato 1994). 
The same principle was followed in the redistribution of land in the 
Amhara region in 1997 (Yigremew, 2001). 
Other than the official channel, farm households acquire land 
informally through gift, renting, loaning, and possibly through 
purchase and mortgaging. In addition, they access common property 
resources. However, the modes of access are fewer and restricted for 
female-headed households. The explanations are rooted in perception 
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that female labor is less critical than male labor (Zenebework and 
Yared, 2000; Yigremew, 2001). 
Female-headed households rarely rent-in land since they often 
lack the resources that a tenant farmer brings to acquire access to land: 
labor for undertaking all farm operations (female-labor rarely engages 
in plowing), farming skills, oxen, and seeds. In an environment where 
land is scarce, competition for land works to the disadvantage of those 
without resources. Such restricted access to land prevails despite 
evidence of unmet demand for land by women farmers. For example, 
current evidence suggests a disproportionate presence of female-
headed households among the landless households, who are rationed 
out from getting land through officials channel including common 
pool resources. 
Female-headed households are disproportionately more on the 
supply side of rental markets 
Holding land by women, a desirable social goal by itself, does 
not often translate into own-cultivation particularly in plow-based 
farming systems. In most cases, they hold a small size of land but, in 
accordance to the definition used through out this paper, they are 
labor-abundant because they lack key complementary resources to 
fully utilize the land, particularly male-adult labor, oxen and finance. 
A woman-household head has four options: (1) call on friends and kin 
to cultivate her land; (2) rent out land either in fixed or share-rental; 
(3) hire in labor, if able to finance and supervise; and (4) abandon 
farming. Generally, wage labor is the less preferred option as 
compared to rental contracts since the full risk of crop failure is borne 
by households hiring wage labor and it also costs to supervise labor 
since labor effort is not observable. Fixed rental is preferred by fewer 
but is least desirable for the risk-averse lessee. A more likely 
compromise is share a tenancy. 
The rental markets offer them choices of getting into share 
tenancy arrangements or renting for fixed cash. The evidence points 
out that the proportion of female-headed households who lease out 
land among all female-headed households is higher than the 
proportion in male-headed households, especially among the poor. 
Even controlling for factors of low-asset holding, male labor and 
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oxen, female-headed households are disposed more towards renting 
out land because of unobservable characteristics (e.g. managerial 
capacity or cultural norm). The choice for tenancy is particularly 
advantageous for poor households who often demand for interlocking 
with other factors to overcome resource constraints including access 
to credit for financing consumption needs. 
Weak security of tenure limits the extent to which women farmers 
exercise their land rights 
The evidence so far indicates that the perception and degree of 
insecurity of tenure vary between farmers. There are two questions 
pertinent to women's landholdings. Are female-controlled farms more 
or less secured than male-controlled farms? To what extent are 
women farmers able to protect and maintain their access to lands? If 
holding land is desirable for bringing social justice, then access to land 
is not sufficient without effective control (Zenebework and Yared, 
2000). 
Households holding PA-land, regardless of gender of headship, 
are entitled legally to a set of use and transfer rights. With these rights 
come obligations: paying tax, meeting environmental standards, and 
relinquishing land holding right if it is deemed by the government 
necessary7. But, in practice, female-headed households are not secured 
and exercise fewer rights. The explanations are threefold. Firstly, 
rights that are legally recognized are not fully and clearly specified 
and/or some are not considered socially legitimate. Secondly, 
institutions enforcing these rights are weak or non-transparent. 
Thirdly, the cost of enforcing is high, particularly if such a cost is 
systematically related to wealth status. The degree of command on 
7 These rights are in principle jointly exercised by married women in male-headed 
households. But married women in male-households bear high risk of losing control 
of land in case of separation. First, these women forfeit their rights to hereditary land 
and access to official land in their natal localities because of the practice of verilocal 
residence at marriage (Zenebework and Yared, 2000; Yigremew, 2001). Second, they 
often start from a weak asset position at the time of marriage. Third, they tend to lose 
in time of divorce. Some region states such as Tigray spreads the risk of losing control 
through distribution of land irrespective of marital status. 
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land is even less in informal land markets where both legal 
recognition and social legitimacy are deficient. The burden of 
enforcing these contracts falls heavily on poor households, 
particularly poor female-households. Because they are dependent on 
male-labor for farming, and are economically weaker to bear the high 
cost of enforcement, and are socially disadvantaged; they are the most 
vulnerable to lose their rights in land and move to non-farm pursuits. 
Whilst the empirical evidence is generally scarce, there are a few 
pointers that indicate that female-headed households are less secured 
in effectively controlling their land rights than male-headed 
households. Firstly, they practice fewer long-term rights such as 
growing trees or bequeathing land. Secondly, they are more 
vulnerable to lose an area of land overtime because of the failure to 
meet continuous cultivation and residency requirements, high costs of 
protecting land rights, and abandoning farming for lack of resources. 
Thirdly, long-term investment in land as a way of protecting land right 
or investing because of security of tenure is weak. Finally, female-
headed households show a greater propensity to abandon farming and 
move to non-farm business as source of livelihood, which is indicative 
of the low commitment to farming under prevailing social norms and 
customs. 
There are explainable gender-related productivity differences 
The empirical evidence, albeit scarce, indicates statistically lower 
return on female-managed farms compared to male-managed farms, 
which is largely related to gender-differentiated yields in field crops 
(Dejene, 1994; Addis et al, 2000; and Yigremew, 2001). These 
differences are related to input intensity (land, labor and capital), 
quality of land, and access to improved technology. The regression 
estimates in Addis et al (2000) show significant gender differences in 
the gross value of output due mainly to lower intensity of factor 
inputs, particularly land, labor, capital and fertilizer, as evident from 
differences in input elasticities between female-managed and male-
managed crop fields. 
The elasticity of production with respect to female-managed land 
is stronger than male-managed land, which is consistent with the 
smallness of land held by female-headed households. Smallness in 
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PA-land in turn correlates with low adult labor content, farming skills 
and ownership of farm assets such as oxen, and constrained access to 
finance. A question of interest is whether male-headed households 
with the same characteristics (i.e., same demographic and resource 
constraints) obtain larger PA-land than female-headed households. 
There is no conclusive and robust evidence yet to demonstrate 
smallness is merely a gender phenomenon independent of these 
correlates. Access to land is gender differentiated, but it is probably 
linked to systematic differences in determinants of access to land. If 
there is systematic bias by gender after controlling for these 
conditioning factors, the bias maybe found in social norms and 
customs that are characteristics of a male-dominated society (for 
example, Yigrtmew, 2001; Zenebework and Yared, 2000). 
How important is the quality of land in explaining gender 
differences in productivity? The evidence generally points out. that 
PA-land controlled by female households tends to be of lower quality 
on average8. Whilst it is speculative, it is more likely that investment 
in land conservation and improvement is low on female-controlled 
plots since the factors that affect investment decisions negatively are 
more prevalent among female-headed households: small farm size and 
subsistence orientation, large presence of dependents and less working 
adults, low asset ownership, insecurity of tenure, off-farm income 
destined mainly for subsistence, and marked poverty. 
Other than the intensity of input use and quality of land, low 
productivity of female-managed farms could be linked to inefficiency 
and lower technological change. Addis et al (2000) simulated the 
productivity of female-headed farms using the average levels of inputs 
applied on male-headed households and concluded no significant 
gender-differentiated productivity differences. Such a conclusion is 
not consistent with some prevailing narrations; for example, women's 
fields are not planted or cultivated on time, high prevalence of tenant 
or hired labor shirking, and weak enforcement of share tenancy. In 
8 However, the literature review in Dejene (1994) suggests such generalization is not 
applicable to backyard crops where female fanners have comparative advantage 
because production on these plots does not require plowing, and the demand for farm 
labor is met with little displacement of labor required in other activities. 
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addition, the robustness of the estimated elasticities in Addis et al 
(2000) is questionable since the econometric estimation does not 
account for land quality and tenure effect, and potential bias 
associated with some of the included endogenous variables. Hence, 
the issue whether female-managed farms are less or more efficient 
remains unsettled. 
In short, gender differences exist in crop productivity. Such 
differences are mainly linked to differences in intensity of factor 
inputs, particularly land, adult labor and traction power. Whilst the 
evidence is not conclusive, the other explanations are lower technical 
efficiency and technology adoption. And investing in improving land 
quality is less likely on women controlled farms. 
Feminization of poverty is in part linked to land endowment and its 
returns 
Generally female-headed households represent a smaller share of 
the rural population, but their percentage is disproportionately higher 
among the poor. The econometric evidence in Deracon and Krishnan 
(1998) find, among others, old age, female headship with no working 
adults, and living in remote areas with poor rainfall contribute to high 
odds of being poor. Mekonnen, Abebe and Bereket (1999) also find 
the probability of falling into poverty is slightly higher for female-
headed households in rural areas. 
For women farmers who depend on land as their primary source 
of livelihood, poverty is related mainly to a low return in agriculture, 
which in turn is related to low production due to a small area of land 
operated and low productivity. For those who depend on renting out 
land, women's weak bargaining position in setting terms of contracts, 
particularly in influencing output sharing, and enforcing contracts 
diminishes return on leased land. Even when women start from 
favorable access to land, as compared to male, they are unable to 
effectively control and utilize it. (Yigremew, 2001). 
Female-headed households without working adult labor are not 
necessarily worse off because of their entry in rental markets. Given 
the gender-differentiated division of labor and low asset position of 
these households, they have to either abandon cultivation or enter into 
rental arrangement. In an environment where land is getting scarce 
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and land rental is on the rise, those female-headed households on the 
supply side of the market should benefit in principle by renting out 
land. However, the smallness and fragmentation of these informal 
markets and associated high transaction costs work to the 
disadvantage of the poor, especially to women farmers whose social 
legitimacy in farming and economic position is weak. 
XIII Land Policy Issues and Response 
The history of land policy sequencing since 1975 has been 
guided by an unbalanced policy framework with heavy emphasis on 
equity through administrative-based land allocation. The land reform 
proclamation of 1975 and the subsequent constitutions vested land 
ownership in the state. Pre-existing tenure systems were abolished and 
major land redistributions were undertaken to provide "land to the 
tillers" in accordance to a need as expressed in the allocation of land 
proportional to household size. A drive towards agrarian 
collectivization was embarked in most of the 1980s but reversed in 
late 1980s. In the 1990s, the constitutionality of state ownership was 
re-affirmed and the region states under the federal structure were 
granted with powers to enact laws and administer. The recent policy 
moves are towards slowing or halting the redistribution of land, 
certification of long-term use rights to land, individualization of 
commons with conditional land contracts, instituting a land use policy, 
and establishing land administration at local level. 
However, as the evidence in the preceding sections informs us, 
there are still formidable challenges ahead, especially in dealing with 
problems of landless, diminution of farm size, correcting imbalances 
in factor proportions at farm level, insecurity of tenure and weak land 
rights, depreciation of the productive capacity of the land, and distress 
land rental or sale. These problems are rooted in the growing gap 
between demand for and supply of land, rigidity in land policy to 
adjust to evolving land "pressure factors", and legal and institutional 
failures. Informed and flexible public policy has an important role in 
shaping and strengthening tenure arrangements that move the society 
towards attaining the primary goals of "equity, efficiency and 
sustainability" in the Ethiopian context 
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A preferred path of policy development would have been to 
allow multiple channels of acquiring land, allow process of factor 
equalization and land transfer towards optimum economic size, 
strengthen security of tenure and rights in land, set norms and 
regulations for protecting fragile ecosystems, promote rental markets 
as main market-based mechanism, encourage labor mobility, and 
enhance the development of factor markets. Instead there have been 
mishaps in the sequencing of land policies. The current policies 
restrict ways of accessing land, emphasize on administrative-based 
land allocation, weak in provision and protection of land rights, 
restrict development of rental markets and mobility of labor, and limit 
indigenous institutions to develop to economize on scarce land 
resources, especially the commons. 
This brief section reiterates the main land issues, highlight the 
empirical evidence, maps to current policies, and comments on the 
efficacy of these policies. The effectiveness of land policy is judged 
by how much it moves towards promoting in a balanced framework 
the trio goals of "equity, efficiency and sustainability". Its efficiency 
is conditional on the extent to which these goals are achieved at low 
economic and environmental costs. 
Expand ways to acquire land and facilitate an efficiency-enhancing 
land transfer 
The empirical evidence shows growing trends in the numbers of 
rural households without access to government allocated land, which 
is contrary to the constitution that guarantees free access to land. 
Reinterpretation of the empirical evidence suggests that land size is 
declining to a level where farmers cannot produce enough food to 
meet their physiological need. Some interpret the latter as equivalent 
to uneconomic land size. The policy implications of not having land to 
produce enough and uneconomic size are different; the first can be 
handled through land-augmenting technology while the latter requires 
a consolidation of land. 
The regression results for determinants of land size and demand 
characteristics of households transacting in the rental market indicate 
that the demand for land will continue to outstrip supply as family size 
increases, labor force within households grows, farmers acquire more 
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farm assets relative to land, and thequality of land depreciates. The 
government intervention and public policy accentuates the demand 
and supply imbalances. Firstly, farmers are not permitted to hold land 
outside their places of residence. Secondly, land available for "free" 
distribution is fixed within peasant associations of their places of 
origin. Thirdly, the numbers of claimants for land are increasing 
because of a strong population momentum and returnees to their place 
of origin. Fourthly, the residency requirement for maintaining use 
rights to land restricts mobility of labor as a way to ease pressure on 
land. Fifthly, the emphasis on the principle of equal land for equal 
sized households, regardless of capacity to utilize land efficiently, 
leaves non-proportionality in factors of production that cannot be 
corrected through administrative-based land allocation. 
It is desirable that individuals seeking to farm have access to land 
that is an economic optimum so that they use land efficiently. The 
desirable policy objectives from the perspective of the goal of creating 
"equitable, efficient and sustainable" tenure system are threefold: (1) 
small but optimal economic size; (2) minimum loss of efficiency; and 
(iii) transfer of land to efficient producers. The current emphasis on 
halting or slowing land redistribution or adjustment, individualization 
of commonly held land resources, and controlling diminution of land 
size may not be sufficient and sustainable (it even contradicts with the 
principle guaranteed access to land as enshrined in the constitution). A 
more long-term policy framework is desirable that: (1) allows farmers 
to acquire land through different channels; (2) strengthens rental land 
markets that provide additional venue to access land, corrects 
imbalances in factor proportions and permits land consolidation; and 
(3) reduces demographic pressure through relaxing constraints that 
restrict mobility of labor and holding land away from the place of 
residence. 
Enhance secured control in land rights 
All measures of insecurity of tenure make farmers face different 
degrees of insecurity particularly uncertainty of holding their plots for 
a long period of time. Insecurity of tenure is heightened among 
farmers operating large farm sizes (relative to family size), operating 
rental land and living in villages with a history of frequent land 
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redistributions. Growing perennial crops tend to strengthen the 
security of landholding. 
Concerns with insecurity of tenure are foremost related to 
stability of tenure and restricted applications of land rights. The 
evidence is relatively thin on effect of tenure insecurity on adoption of 
agricultural technology but strong on disincentive effect on investing 
in land conservation and improvement.. Fear of losing government-
allocated land and insecurity of holding land for long periods also 
restricts contractual choices in rental markets. Contracts in rental 
markets are short-term with more restrictions on use and transfer 
rights as compared to PA-land. 
The desirable policy objectives are to create stable and secured 
tenure systems that permit farmers to fully exercise rights in land at 
low enforcement and transaction costs. Public responses so far involve 
granting bequeathing use rights to land, halting or slowing 
redistribution of land to create a climate of stability, titling use rights 
in some region states, and accepting in principle compensation for 
added value in land in case of government expropriation. 
These policy measures are the types necessary towards 
enhancing the goal of an "equitable, efficient and sustainable" tenure 
system, especially the titling of use rights. However, the provision of 
full legal entitlement to privately owned use rights that are tradable 
would further strengthen security of tenure and improve liquidity of 
rental markets. Compensation fully at market value in time of land 
acquisition by the government is assuring if a transparent institutional 
mechanism exists to implement and enforce such measures. 
Sustaining or improving productive capacity of land is a key land 
policy objective 
It is not only the quantity but also the productive capacity of land 
which is falling. This is manifested in different ways. Soil fertility is 
declining due to depletion of essential nutrients and water moisture. 
Crop yields are declining in response to depletion of nutrients. Crop 
diversity is diminishing thereby restricting crop and variety choices. 
The relation between rainfall and production is stronger than ever and 
hence slight decline in rainfall causes a considerable fall in 
production. Farmers are aware of land degradation. However, their 
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response in terms of investing in land improvement, particularly in the 
capitalization of land, has been constrained by a set of factors: high 
demographic burden, small number of working adults, low and 
uncompetitive returns in agriculture, poverty, and insecurity of tenure. 
The key policy objectives are to slow down or arrest land 
degradation and recover land that is out of production if economically 
feasible. Public policy has a pivotal role in: (i) developing a 
comprehensive agro-ecological mapping and land use plan for the 
whole country; (ii) developing a long-term national soil fertility 
program that promotes good land husbandry practices and generation 
of soil-improving technologies; (iv) promoting soil and water 
conservation structures within the farming systems, especially 
community-based conservation activities; (v) establishing and 
promoting land resource information to land users; and (vi) protecting 
fragile eco-systems. 
Whilst the empirical evidence indicates an improved security of 
tenure it is not sufficient by itself to overcome farmers' unwillingness 
to capitalize their farmlands, it has a key role to play. The 
aforementioned policies, particularly the provision of full legal 
entitlement to privately owned use rights that are tradable and fair 
value compensation, create incentives for millions of farmers to invest 
in land. 
Permit tradable (rental) land rights and reduce transaction costs 
The advantages of rental markets over sales markets in an 
environment where other factor markets (credit, insurance) are 
missing or incomplete are well known: low transaction cost, low 
capital requirement to access land, and low incidence of distress land 
sales. The empirical evidence from case studies in Ethiopia so far 
points out that rental land markets have beneficial effects of providing 
alternative access to land, enabling farmers to pool resources, and 
equalizing factor proportions and equalizing distribution of 
landholdings. Although the evidence on productive efficiency and 
technology adoption is not conclusive, the tenure effect on 
productivity is not sizable particularly when the risk and resource 
pooling benefits are accounted for. 
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Notwithstanding these benefits, however, transactions in these 
markets are localized because of a prohibition to transact outside place 
of residence, and restrictions on contracts and rights. The markets are 
fragmented and operate in low volume at high transaction cost. They 
also function in a legal environment with no enforceable mechanisms. 
Policy changes are necessary to relax the current restrictions on land 
rental markets such as the size of land, duration, and rental rate. With 
more choices of contracts, farmers are able to find alternative venues 
to access land and correct imbalances in factor proportions at farm 
level. Providing a legal status to these informal contracts is an 
important step so that they operate in an environment where contracts 
are legal and enforceable. 
Improve management of common resources and collective action 
With the exception of agricultural lands, the major land resources 
(i.e., pasture, water and forests) are held and managed collectively 
under a variety of tenure regimes. Under prevailing conditions of low 
productivity and variability in production, particularly in the case of 
extensive rangelands in the arid and semiarid areas, collective 
arrangements that allows mobility over an expansive rangeland is the 
most cost-effective arrangement. Cooperative collective action 
becomes desirable as these resources become increasingly scarce. 
Privatization is not a cost-effective option because of high transaction 
costs relative to return on these resources and a high risk factor. 
The existing empirical evidence points to declining trends in 
these resources both in quantity and quality. Despite the need for a 
more cohesive and cooperative collective action to economize and 
effectively utilize scarce resources while allowing flexibility in 
defining boundaries and mobility, there are forces that are working 
towards weakening collective action. Indigenous institutions are 
breaking down because of adverse public policies, territorial 
contraction through encroachment, and conflict over scarce resources. 
Public policy, instead of strengthening these institutions and 
enhancing conditions that are favorable towards privatization (e.g. 
increase productivity and return on these resources, lower transaction 
costs, and reduce risk conditions), it is hastening the erosion of these 
institutions. Consequently, there are cases of an institutional vacuum 
7 2 
and open access where widespread destruction of common property 
resources has occurred. 
There is no uniform policy that is applicable to the different 
types of common property resources. However, there are important 
elements of public policy and action that are commonly applicable. 
Firstly, enhance the effectiveness of indigenous institutions where 
socioeconomic parameters and risk conditions dictate continuation of 
collective action. Secondly, strengthen indigenous mechanisms for 
conflict resolution arising from violation of boundaries and 
encroachment. Thirdly, promote conditions that improve productivity 
of collective resources and reduce costs. Fourthly, institute devices to 
manage risk that are not adversely affecting incentives for 
conservation and improvement of collective resources. Fifthly, 
restrain from pushing privatization of the commons under conditions 
where the need for an expansive boundary is strong to allow spatial 
mobility, costs of delimiting private boundaries and enforcing are 
considerably high, and private returns are low. Finally, learn from the 
different tenure arrangements on their efficacy and efficiency and 
develop informed public policies that are consistent with equity, 
efficiency and sustainability of collective resources. 
Enhance women's legal rights and translate them into practices 
Whilst the empirical evidence is sparse, there is an apparent 
gender-differentiation in access to land including common pool 
resources, effective control of land rights, utilization and sustenance 
of land resources, and welfare outcomes related to land. The 
fundamental issue is the prevailing social norms and customs in regard 
to recognition of woman as able farm operators and managers. Under 
the prevailing gender differentiated division of labor where adult male 
support is a key constraint in crop farming (exceptions are backyard 
plots and farming systems where hoe-technology is the dominant 
technology), the focus needs to be placed more on woman as 
managers than as owner cultivators. 
The issues and policy orientation than addresses inequities in 
access to land, strengthening security of tenure and effective land 
rights, and improving participation and bargaining positions in land 
markets. Public policy needs to enhance access to land through 
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inheritance, administrative allocation and markets. Having access is 
not sufficient without effective land control, which calls for 
enforceable legal rights, enhanced social acceptability, lowering costs 
of enforcement. Holding land is not good on its own unless women 
are able to farm or to transfer land to efficient farmers through 
markets. The policy recommendations above for opening up land 
markets and operate at low cost are applicable here but with a special 
emphasis that women enter into these markets from disadvantaged 
economic and social conditions. 
Remove political and administrative restrictions on mobility of labor 
The important role of labor mobility as a vehicle for matching 
land and labor and spreading benefits of economic growth such as 
employment and wage is often neglected in the land debate in 
Ethiopia. The current land policy restricts access to land in places of 
origin and hence discourages labor mobility for an extended period of 
time. In addition, ethnic-based aggregation, laxity in protection of 
minority rights and conflicts discourage labor mobility. 
Heightened insecurity of land begets undesirable land use 
practices such as clearing land that could be considered idle and 
underutilized to preempt land confiscation. Conflicts over land 
resources threaten insecurity and uncertainty over land rights. It also 
pushes people to their birthplaces and thereby accentuates competition 
for land, landlessness and conflicts. There is thus a need to relax the 
current restrictions on mobility of labor so that farmers are able to 
transact land outside their residential boundaries. 
Set land policies in a pro-poor agricultural growth framework 
The country needs to push for sustainable rapid agricultural 
growth in a balanced economic growth framework but centered on 
smallholder agriculture. The mandate of agriculture in the context of a 
pro-poor growth framework is larger than improved production 
performance (productivity, profitability and competitiveness). Its 
performance is also judged by how much it contributes to the 
improvement in human welfare (i.e., reducing poverty, food and 
nutrition insecurity). 
7 4 
For the growth process to be pro-poor, it is necessary that it: (1) 
captures large segments of the population through the provision of 
secured access to land, opening physical and market access, (2) 
economizes on and increase productivity of scarce factors such as land 
and fully and effectively utilizes the abundant factor (e.g. off-season 
labor); (3) lower costs of transactions through investing in 
infrastructure, markets and innovative institutions; (4) invests in 
human resources, reduces demographic burden and fosters 
demographic transition; and (5) improves management of scarce and 
fragile natural resources. Since agricultural income sources tend to be 
risky, managing risk is a key component of such an agricultural 
growth strategy. 
The major land distributions since 1975 have in effect created 
favorable conditions for initiating a broad-based growth process. Land 
policies that focus on efficiency-enhancing land transfer, secured 
control in land rights, unimpeded growth in land markets in 
conjunction with other factor markets, and maintenance and 
improvement of land resources are consistent with pro-poor 
agricultural growth policies and strategies. These policies have to be 
complemented by investments in research and technology generation 
to enhance agricultural productivity and reduce costs of production, 
and physical infrastructure and institutions including markets to 
reduce transaction costs. 
XIV Synthesis and Conclusions: Lessons for Future Policy 
There are important changes since 1975 in tenure arrangements 
and relations that affect modes of land access, rights to land, size and 
distribution of landholdings, efficiency and technological change in 
agricultural production, investment in land and future productivity, 
and living standards of millions of Ethiopians, rural as well as urban. 
Public policy has had an important role in evolution of these tenure 
arrangements that has had a material effect on equity, efficiency and 
sustainability. 
The majority of farmers today have land holdings obtained 
through government land allocation (PA-land allocation). They have 
open-ended usufruct rights as long as they are able to cultivate 
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continuously and meet the physical residency requirement. These use 
rights are inheritable. 
Although the PA-land allocation has been the main venue for 
land acquisition, its importance is on the decline. Instead, there are 
multiple informal channels that are non-market based (borrowing, 
gifts, transfer to heirs) as well as market based (fixed rent, share 
tenancy). The numbers of farmers transacting in rental land markets 
are particularly increasing albeit a questionable constitutional and 
legal cover. Administrative-based land allocation is gradually giving 
way to rental markets where what matters is not mere household size 
but farming skills, knowledge, available working labor, and capital. 
Whilst farm size is small in general, its size as well as quality is 
declining. There are, however, significant differences in landholdings 
with areas of land operated at farm level statistically related to village 
level fixed-effects (population density, topography, soil type, 
proximity to urban or market centers), household demography 
(household size, age, and gender), and access to rental land. The fact 
that the area of land operated depends mainly on household land and 
labor endowments indicates that the markets for land and labor are not 
fully functioning to obviate the need to depend on their initial 
endowments. 
The administrative based land allocation has contributed towards 
shifting land holdings towards the middle and lower ends of the 
distribution. But the effect of such an equalization through 
compression has increased the number of people holding land than 
increase in area of land. The process of equalization has been 
reinforced through rental land markets, which is consistent with the 
global evidence in Deininger and Squire (1998) and the African case 
of Rwanda (Andre and Platteau, 1998) with similar characteristics of 
high population density, land scarcity, and low agricultural 
productivity. Unlike the PA-allocation, such equalization has been 
accompanied with factor equalization at farm level and increased area 
of land operated by initially land-constrained households. 
At the lower end of the land distribution, however, there are 
disquieting developments. Firstly, as land becomes scarce, the 
constitutional right of "guaranteed land entitlement" and the principle 
of "equal-sized land to equal-sized households" are failing as evident 
from growing landlessness and the diminishing size of farm that new 
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claimants acquire through the official channel. The numbers of 
farmers without land are rising amidst a depressed rural economy with 
no alternative livelihoods to escape poverty. Secondly, land size is 
approaching uneconomical size where increases in farm inputs have 
diminishing marginal effects on production. Thirdly, smallness tends 
to be compensated for by the allocation of higher quality soils in a 
government-land allocation system, but this cannot be substantiated in 
rental transactions. And smaller farmers are not investing as much in 
land conservation and improvement because of subsistence pressure. 
Production-based studies establish land as the dominant factor 
input in Ethiopian smallholder agriculture. It enters into production 
function in three ways: pure quantity effect, its quality attributes, and 
tenure effect. Land is getting scarce because of the declining land 
supply with rising slopes due to increasing economic and 
environmental costs, growing demand for land, and failure of 
institutions to economize on scarce land resources. As land size gets 
smaller, the production and land relations are getting tighter because 
of undeveloped production and conservation technologies to ease land 
constraint. The tenure effect on production works through its incentive 
on input intensity and technical inefficiency, on change in 
composition of crops, and on adoption of technological change. The 
evidence so far indicates that productivity gaps exist between farms 
under different tenure arrangements mainly arising from the 
composition effect and technical inefficiency, especially on shared 
plots. The empirical evidence on explaining the sources of tenure 
related technical inefficiency is, however, thin and at times 
speculative. 
Land tenure also has a long-term consequence on productivity 
through its effect on land investment. The empirical evidence shows 
that the productive capacity of arable land is eroding. Farmers do 
recognize the severity of soil degradation on their farm plots, 
particularly those plots under long tenure. Some employ labor-
intensive indigenous land conservation practices, especially in areas 
with a history of severe land degradation. However, the extent of land 
conservation and improvement, and their capital intensity are limited 
relative to the extent of land degradation due to smallness of land size, 
demographic burden, insecurity of tenure, low and uncertain return to 
farming, and poverty. 
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Insecurity of land tenure is not felt equally among all farm 
households. It tends to heighten among farmers living in villages with 
a history of frequent land redistribution, holding large land relative to 
available family labor, and cultivating rental land. Farmers growing 
perennial crops tend to feel more secured on their holdings. In 
addition to negatively affecting investment in land, insecurity of 
tenure also affects the functioning of rental land markets. The 
explanations for preponderance of short-term rental contracts, 
emphasis on annual crops, and low volume of rental transactions are 
mainly rooted in lack of long-term security on government allocated 
lands. 
Land connects to poverty, as measured by the deprivation of 
basic needs and especially food mainly through its effect on 
agricultural productivity, which is the main livelihood for millions of 
Ethiopian farmers. Increasing productivity goes a long way in 
reducing poverty and undernutrition. There are, however, three 
qualifiers. Firstly, it is not land size per se but also the quality of land 
that matters in explaining poverty. Secondly, land is one of the 
determinants of poverty and hence it is not sufficient by itself to 
identify the poor consistently, particularly in Ethiopian context where 
holding government-allocated land does not mean households are 
economically better off. Thirdly, overcoming poverty requires more 
than the distribution of land; improved productivity of land and 
lowered marketing costs to convert increased productivity into higher 
real farm income. For poor tenant farmers, however, rising rental rate 
may partly offset the gains in productivity and income, and hence 
growing out of poverty is a slower process. 
Issues of land access, farm size, land productivity and 
investment, and land-linked poverty are not gender-neutral albeit 
scarce empirical evidence. Modes of access to land are fewer and 
restricted for female-headed households. Farm size tends to be among 
these households, which is apparently related to low adult labor 
content, non-land assets, and farming skills. Rights in land are fewer 
and effective command is weak. Productivity is lower on women-
managed fields, which is related to lower factor intensity, land quality, 
technical inefficiency and technological change. For women farmers 
who depend on land, poverty is related to low return to agriculture 
and/or land rental. In an environment where land is scarce and land 
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rental is on the rise, female-headed households should benefit in 
principle by renting out land. However, because of their weak 
command on exercising their rights in land, they are unable to set and 
enforce favorable terms and conditions, and hence return to these 
markets. 
Evolving past and present policies are guided by the ideology of 
public control of land, entitlement of a minimum guaranteed land free 
to all, and a great fear that opening land markets provides inroads for 
involuntary dispossession of land from poor and vulnerable peasants. 
These prevailing thoughts are enshrined in the constitution and 
translated into policies and laws that: (i) claim to guarantee universal 
access to land in places of residence; (ii) restrict choices of tenure 
arrangements; (iii) perpetuate insecurity of tenure and thereby reduces 
effectiveness of land rights and investment in land; (iv) inhibit 
development of indigenous institutions that have been particularly 
effective in managing the commons; (v) limit labor mobility; and (vi) 
fail to recognize that land is linked to poverty in major ways and 
growing out of poverty requires balanced policies that advance 
equitable but efficient farming systems that are also sustainable. 
There have been some policy changes over the years in some 
region states to overcome some of these limitations but with mixed 
efficacy. The current emphasis on halting or slowing land 
redistribution or adjustment may reduce land fragmentation, 
diminution of farm size, and insecurity of tenure. But such a policy in 
a context of restricted tenure choices and labor mobility negates the 
universal guarantee to land and is insufficient to set an effective 
process of land transfer and the consolidation of farms. The move 
towards titling use rights in some regions is in the right direction but it 
would be even more effective if long-term tradable privately owned 
use rights were provided. Individualization of the commons as a way 
to reverse land degradation in the commons requires a careful testing 
since cooperative collective action maybe a cost-effective option 
under prevailing conditions of low productivity and variability in 
production in the commons, particularly in the arid and semi-arid 
areas. The policy towards legal recognition of rental land markets and 
its functioning in some region states is a desirable move, but the 
attempt to manage these markets through administrative control calls 
firstly for a careful experimentation and understanding of the 
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functioning and effect of these markets. Nurturing and fostering rental 
land markets is a necessary intermediary process towards a fully 
developed land market in tandem with the development of other 
missing or incomplete factor markets. Public policy has thus an 
important role in the future, but it needs an informed and a balanced 
view that emphasizes on searching for equitable but efficient and 
sustainable tenure arrangements that are mediated through the market 
place. 
Finally, land reform is one of the basic requirements for agriculture 
and rural development. Smallholder-led agricultural development that 
builds on existing broadly distributed land assets is pivotal for growing 
out of poverty and undernutrition. At the core of such strategies are 
consolidation of uneconomic farms; improving productivity of land 
through improved efficiency, technological change and land 
management; reducing transaction costs through building infrastructure 
and markets; and creating institutions that provide a vehicle for the poor 
to voice their priorities, deliver agricultural inputs and finance, and 
market their produce at competitive prices. Land reform by itself is not 
sufficient without addressing these other growth movers. 
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